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Introduction
In December 2010 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
the body of the UN responsible for crafting global climate change policy, met in Cancún, Mexico and
agreed to the “Cancún Agreements” – a loose framework of policy proposals based upon the controversial
“Copenhagen Accord” proposed by the United States, Brazil, China, India and South Africa just one year
earlier. While less than 40 states originally agreed to the “Copenhagen Accord” in December 2009, every
state in the world signed onto the “Cancún Agreements” with the exception of Bolivia, who stood by an
alternative set of proposals (the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba”) put forth by the World People’s
Conference on Climate Change (WPCCC) – a climate conference hosted by Bolivian President Evo
Morales in April 2010.
All of these policy makers and political actors agree that anthropogenic climate change is a threat
to human societies and ecosystems around the world, and both claim to be arguing in favor of
“sustainable development,” yet the two agreements structure climate policy in dramatically different ways
with very different practical implications, and there are passionate advocates on both sides of this heated
debate. In the following project I will argue that this climate policy discussion is an important piece of
the larger debate about “sustainable development.” But what does “sustainable development” mean in the
modern climate policy debate? What exactly is being “sustained”? How has the United Nations defined
it, and how has that framed the way that representatives at the UNFCCC have thought about modern
climate policy? What about President Evo Morales and the participants at the WPCCC – how do they
conceptualize “sustainable development,” how has that influenced their opposition to the UNFCCC’s
proposals, and how has it informed the creation of their alternative? What dynamic is happening between
these two proposals? And most importantly, what real world implications will result from each of these
various climate policies, and how will that affect human societies and ecosystems across the world?
In this project I will seek to answer these and other related questions by looking deeper into the
two conferences, critically evaluating the resulting climate policy proposals (the “Cancún Agreements”
and the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba;” hereafter referred to as “Cancún” and “Cochabamba”),
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and demonstrating how political power and economic interests have shaped the debate. I will explore who
the participants and decision-makers were within each conference, describe the difference between these
two opposing proposals, explore the logics underlying each framework, and discuss how political and
economic power has disciplined the climate policy debate as it has played out over the past few years.
Juxtaposing these two conferences will demonstrate that these two different policy frameworks are
advocated for by opposing sets of political actors who each define “sustainable development” differently,
based off of their own perceived self-interests and conceptualizations of “nature” and “development.” In
doing so, I argue that “Cancún” reflects a policy framework designed to sustain the modern neoliberal and
industrial model of capitalist development while “Cochabamba” attempts to embed industrial and
consumer capitalism within a set of broader social concerns (i.e. human and environmental rights) in an
effort to form a counter movement against neoliberal capitalism.
The key distinction between these two perspectives has to do with how climate change is
understood as a threat, and why. Generally speaking, the wealthier, more industrialized nations
supporting “Cancún” see climate change as a threat to economic development, measured and understood
mostly through market valuation and GDP growth. Alternatively, the “poorer” country of Bolivia, and
allied social movements and organizations from the “Global South” see climate change as a threat to
human societies (especially the most vulnerable), various natural ecosystems, and the survival of local
cultures because of its potentially devastating and disproportionate damage caused to communities around
the world who had little or nothing to do with contributing to the crisis. For this reason, they believe the
capitalist form of development that “Cancún” seeks to sustain is actually the problem, not the solution.
There is a large gulf between these two positions, and various other interests and motivations for climate
policy between them. However, at the UN when the many other actors involved in this debate were given
a choice between these two perspectives, they fell in line behind “Cancún” for various geopolitical
reasons (more on this in Chapter 3).
In the end, I hope to demonstrate three key points. First, climate change policy cannot merely be
thought of as simply pertaining to environmental protection but instead must be seen as inherently
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intertwined with political and economic concerns, interests, and power. One cannot separate the issue of
climate change from fundamental questions about political and economic systems because the crisis of
climate change is a direct result of industrialized development for over 2 centuries. More specifically, I
will argue that the dynamic between these two proposals can be adequately understood through the theory
of the “Double Movement” proposed by Karl Polanyi. Second, the proposals agreed to in “Cancún”
inadequately understand climate change as merely a hindrance to global economic output. This narrow
view of the dangers of climate change misses a whole host of other serious issues that are raised by the
“Cochabamba” proposals: the effect that climate change will have on the world’s most vulnerable (people
living in poverty, indigenous peoples, climate migrants), the effect on ecosystems and non-human life
around the world, and deeper and more fundamental questions about how “nature” is conceptualized and
whether or not capitalism itself is “sustainable.” To demonstrate how this is a reflection of Polanyi’s
“Double Movement,” I will explain how “Cochabamba” continuously highlights how market capitalism
leads to vast social dislocation among various populations and widespread ecological destruction, thus
rationalizing their call for the need to embed market activity within larger social concerns to ensure
adequate human and environmental protections. Third, I will argue that despite its shortcomings,
“Cancún” is likely to become the basis for the future international climate regime given the way political
and economic powers have shaped the policy debate.
“Cancún” is designed by and in the interests of global political and economic elites and those
dependent upon the industrial economic system. Given the way in which those powers have shaped the
debate there is little reason to believe that a more comprehensive (or just) climate policy will result.
Thus, I will finally conclude that adequately addressing the threat of climate change requires policy
makers, social movements, and world leaders to fundamentally question the predominance of the global
industrial capitalist system. We all must truly grapple with what “sustainable development” means in the
era of industrial capitalism and climate change. This is something that “Cochabamba” attempted to do at
the UN, yet its proponents were quickly ignored and dismissed by the policy community. They may not
have the perfect solution, but they bring up fundamental questions that cannot be ignored for long.
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Implicit in these characterizations are many terms that are loaded, problematic, and/or often
misused and misunderstood. I define “Cancún” as neoliberal and as supporting industrialized free market
capitalist development. This will be explored more fully in Chapter 1, however, it is important to clarify
what I mean when I use these terms. I characterize “Cancún” as neoliberal because it seeks all of its
solutions through market mechanisms (commodifying even pollution) with a minimized role for state
regulation or interference into market activity (or in the case of proposed carbon markets - utilizing the
state to build a new market). I characterize “Cancún” as industrial and free market capitalist because it
places the focus of climate policy on maintaining an economic system predicated upon mass production
and consumption via accumulation of capital and profit. “Cochabamba” seeks challenge these dynamics
through a countermovement, explicitly citing that logic and method of market-driven development as the
problem causing climate change, not the solution. Thus, they propose to situate an alternative climate
regime whereby market activity occurs within larger social concerns based upon human and
environmental rights.
The term neoliberalism is a loaded term used by many academics, typically to describe the most
current formulation of capitalism that emerged after the Cold War. Many dispute whether or not it is
even useful in analyzing development policy given that it has meant different things to different authors at
different times.1 I recognize this, but I will still use the term neoliberalism to categorize “Cancún”
because it most accurately reflects the way in which the policy is designed, and the type of mechanisms
used to implement it. I will use the definition of “neoliberalism” put forth by David Harvey. He defines
neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”2 Neoliberalism is, in
essence, a political and economic configuration in which states create, maintain, and/or facilitate the
spread of an institutional framework that promotes 1) commodification and/or the creation of private
property, 2) markets free of regulation, and 3) the elimination of barriers to international trade. This
complex process requires a number of political and economic actors at international, regional, national,
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and local levels to promote widespread commodification and privatization, dramatically reduce social
welfare spending and governmental regulations in most areas (such as environmental protection or
financial regulation), increase regulations in other areas (such as property rights and intellectual property
rights), and establish mechanisms for global free trade (such as the elimination of tariffs). As Chapter 2
will discuss in much greater detail, “Cancún” utilizes these mechanisms as the basis for its proposed
climate regime (specifically the further commodification and privatization of pollution, and the
establishment of international “carbon markets,” taking power of regulating carbon pollution out of the
purview of states and into the hands of market forces).
I also use the term industrial to characterize the model of economic development sustained by
“Cancún.” This is important because the industrial nature of the capitalist system cannot be taken out of
any discussion of climate change given that the GHG emissions that have caused the crisis are directly the
result of the industrialized production and consumption patterns inherent in industrial development (and
this is true for both capitalist and socialist forms of development). Industrial development (i.e. “Fordist”
and “post-Fordist”3) mass-produces vast amounts of goods and services for various social groups, and has
relied heavily upon the burning of fossil fuels to do this. It also understands “nature” as property, and an
input into larger systems of production and consumption, and nothing more.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, is the term capitalism itself. I characterize “Cancún” as
designed to sustain capitalism because it sustains an economic model predicated upon endless capital
accumulation and profit seeking. Once again, I will borrow from Harvey in describing capitalism as a
system requiring perpetual growth. He argues that “in the absence of any limits or barriers, the need to
reinvest in order to remain a capitalist propels capitalism to expand at a compound rate. This then creates
a perpetual need to find new fields of activity to absorb the reinvested capital: hence ‘the capital surplus
absorption problem’… Clearly, there is no limit to the monetary capacity to fuel growth.”4 Here, he gives
voice to a popular Marxist understanding of capitalism as a system that requires an endless compound
growth in order to survive. Thus, capitalist development is constantly expanding and seeking new sectors
of society in which capital can be accumulated (e.g. agriculture, goods, services, global trade, financial
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markets, debt, etc.). In fact, Harvey agues that capitalism falls into crisis if/when a new sector for profit
and accumulation cannot be found (recently pointing to the 2007-2008 financial crisis as an example).A
Therefore, taken together, I argue that “Cancún” utilizes neoliberal mechanisms (private
property, “free” markets, and international trade) to support and maintain industrial (mass production
treating nature as an input) capitalism (a system requiring endless growth and accumulation to survive).
Climate change is perhaps the most pressing crisis facing the world today because it poses a
serious threat not only to human societies but also to ecosystems throughout the planet. Global civil
society must pressure international policy makers and relevant industries to act immediately if the worst
impacts of climate change are to be avoided.5 The climate policy debate will, in the coming years, likely
result in an international “climate regime” that will have a dramatic impact on international development,
politics, and various social relations for generations. Given the severity of the climate crisis and the need
to adequately address the issue quickly it is my hope that this analysis will highlight the complexities of
the international climate policy debate, clarify the political context within which it is taking place, and
help lead to a more appropriate policy response. Additionally, the climate crisis is inherently intertwined
with international political and economic systems because it is a direct result of the way in which human
societies produce and consume goods and services, especially energy.6 Therefore, this project will
hopefully contribute to the growing literature surrounding fundamental questions of “sustainability,”
especially with respect to the dominant industrial capitalist political and economic systems.7
Background
In this section I will provide an overview of anthropogenic climate change, identify its projected
impact on human society and the environment, and discuss the general policy framework proposed by
climate scientists as the appropriate response to the crisis. Then, I will provide a brief overview of
climate policy history as it relates to the two conferences considered in this proposal. Then I will present
an Overview outlining the rest of the paper.

A

This is also the only period in modern history in which global greenhouse gas emissions reduced, further
demonstrating the relationship between the global industrial capitalist system and climate change.
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Anthropogenic Climate Change: Origins, Impacts and Responses
The most recent and authoritative scientific report on the origins and expected impacts of
anthropogenic climate change is arguably the Fourth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released in 2007.8 The IPCC was established by the United Nations
Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and endorsed by
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to be the leading authority on assessing and synthesizing
science about anthropogenic climate change. Their Fourth Assessment Report (2007) summarizes the
consensus of over 3,000 scientists from an extensive international peer-review process. Additionally,
both the UNFCCC and the WPCCC largely accept the consensus put forth by the IPCC’s 2007 report as
the foundation for their climate policy proposals9 in a similar way that the IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report (1995) provided the basis for the Kyoto Protocol.10 The 2007 report had notable differences from
the report published in 1995, mainly in that it argued much more forcefully that climate change is a result
of human activity, the climate system was warming quicker than previously anticipated, and its projected
impacts were expected to be much more dangerous than previously estimated. Specifically, the 2007
report establishes that “warming of the climate system is unequivocal” citing a 0.74°C increase in average
global surface temperature from 1906-2006, and this warming trend dramatically accelerated from 19562006.11 It further argues that “most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the
mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gas] GHG
concentrations [emphasis in original].”12 These GHGs are primarily carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), and nitrous oxide (N2O), and their increased concentration in the atmosphere is largely the cause
of human activity since 1750, specifically from fossil fuel use and other sizeable contributions coming
from land-use change (e.g. deforestation) and industrialized agriculture.B,13
This process of increased GHG concentrations as a result of human activities leading to an

B

Industrial agriculture requires more fossil fuels to centrally mass-produce agriculture products and transport them over long
distances. Some types of industrial agriculture, such as livestock, also produce excess methane gas, which is much more potent of
a GHG than carbon dioxide. Lastly, the large amount of land required for industrial agriculture has often provided further drivers
to changes in land-use patterns (mostly deforestation), thus further contributing to increasing GHG emissions.
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increase in average global temperatures is what the IPCC refers to as “anthropogenic climate change.”
This has already led to observed changes in the global ecosystem (including changes in ice/snow patterns,
the terrestrial biosphere, and marine/freshwater biological systems). These changes have impacted
natural systems (such as plant growth, animal behavior and migration) as well as human systems
(including agricultural output and human health). As anthropogenic climate change accelerates, the
severity of these impacts will depend upon the average increase in global temperature (which is projected
to increase up to 5°C by the end of the century if current emission trends continue). These impacts will
largely affect five major areas: water, ecosystems, food, coasts, and health.
Impacts on water systems will be substantial, including water stress for hundreds of millions of
people as a result of increased precipitation/floods in certain regions and decreased precipitation/water
availability in others. Impacts on ecosystems include widespread environmental destruction as a result of
climate change-related disturbances (such as floods, droughts, wildfires, insect behavior, and ocean
acidification) and other drivers of climate change (such as land-use change, pollution, and overexploitation of resources). Roughly 20-30% of plant and animal species run the risk of extinction if
global temperature increases rise between 1.5°C and 2.5°C, and entire ecosystems may be destroyed if
temperatures increase beyond that range. Impacts on food systems will vary greatly depending on
temperature increase and region. While slight increases of temperature (1-3°C) may result in increased
crop productivity in high-latitude regions and decreased productivity in mid and low-latitude regions,
great increases of temperature (3-5°C) will likely result in decreased crop productivity in most areas.
Impacts on coastal regions will include erosion of coastal land and increased flooding. The worst impacts
on coastal areas will likely result if temperatures increase beyond 2-3°C, with the potential of millions of
people (primarily those in low-lying deltas in Africa, Asia and small island nations) to be affected by
flooding or loss of land. Impacts on human health will result primarily because of increased deaths from
weather-related events (such as heat waves or other extreme weather events) but also due to the spread of
water-borne and insect-borne illnesses (such as cholera, dengue fever, and malaria).
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When discussing the impacts that anthropogenic climate change will have on human society it is
important to note that most of them will disproportionately affect poorer communities around the world
because they are the most vulnerable to climatic changes and have the fewest resources available to them
to adapt. Climate change is expected to have a dramatically negative impact on African farmers’ output
and food security,14 lead to as many as 200 million forced migrants (also called “climate refugees”) in
sub-Saharan Africa, China, India, and Latin America by the year 2050,15 significantly increase water
scarcity in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region.16 There are countless other examples of how
climate change is projected to affect poorer and “less-developed” countries, which has led international
development organizations such as the World Bank to conclude that “development goals are threatened
by climate change, with the heaviest impacts on poor countries and poor people.”17 Additionally, the
populations expected to be most impacted by climate change are also those who are least responsible for
the historical emissions of GHGs causing the climate crisis.18
Given the various overwhelmingly negative impacts that climate change is likely to bring about
for the global ecosystem and human society, the IPCC has put forth a framework for formulating an
appropriate response to the problem of anthropogenic climate change. This framework, which is loosely
adopted by most policy makers, promotes two complementary responses: 1) mitigation (the reduction of
future GHG emissions) and 2) adaptation (socially and ecologically adapting to climate change impacts).
The capacity for human societies to mitigate/adapt largely depends upon their socio-economic
circumstance, and required adaptation is largely dependent upon the level of mitigation (more mitigation
requires less adaptation, less mitigation requires more adaptation). While “Cancún” and the
“Cochabamba” both put forth dramatically different policy proposals for addressing climate change, they
both adopt mitigation and adaptation as the fundamental pillars of their overall policy framework (this
will be explored more in Chapter 2), but the way in which they would mitigate GHG emissions and
mobilize resources for adaptation differ dramatically.
Climate Policy History
Given the threat that anthropogenic climate change poses to the environment and human society,
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policy makers have taken numerous steps towards crafting an international response to address the issue.
In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 1992 the United Nations hosted the first “Earth Summit” to bring together
heads of state from around the world to address environmental protection and sustainable development.
One of the outcomes of this summit was the creation of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Under this Convention, the UNFCCC became the legally-recognized organ
of the UN that deals with the process of tracking GHG emissions around the world, coordinating
mitigation and adaptation efforts, and providing a venue for debating future climate agreements.
Beginning in 1995, the UNFCCC began annual summits, or “Conference of Parties” (COP).
During the third annual summit (COP3) held in Kyoto, Japan in 1997, the UNFCCC formally adopted the
“Kyoto Protocol.” This put in place a legally-binding framework in which most industrialized countries
pledged to reduce their GHG emissions by 5% of 1990 levels during the period 2008-2012.19 The Kyoto
Protocol also created a number of legal and financial mechanisms such as a voluntary global GHG
emissions market and a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in which developed countries could
“offset” their GHG emissions through investments in “clean development” projects in less-developed
countries. The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by most of the world’s leading industrialized nations, with the
exception of Australia and the United States (although Australia later went on to ratify the treaty). Russia
signed on with extremely weak emissions reductions targets, and countries like Brazil, China, and India
signed on but were not required to make any emissions reductions.
The Kyoto Protocol is currently the climate policy that is in place until it expires in 2012, so the
UNFCCC continues to hold annual COP summits and policy makers there are working on a treaty that
will replace it. There were high expectations for the COP15 summit in Copenhagen, Denmark that took
place in 2009 (primarily because the new US President Barack Obama had signaled willingness to engage
in the process unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush). Unfortunately, Copenhagen did not lead to a
legally-binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol (which most policy analysts believe was because
neither the US nor China were willing to commit to legally-binding emission reductions).20 Instead, the
US, along with Brazil, China, India and South Africa, proposed the “Copenhagen Accord.” This proposal

12

moved the policy debate forward in many areas by pledging to cap warming of the climate system by 2C
above pre-industrial levels and pledging to mobilize significantly large financing for mitigation and
adaptation efforts in less-developed countries.21 However, the “Copenhagen Accord” was only “noted” in
the COP15 summit because it only received support from 37 of the 192 countries that are parties to the
UNFCCC. Most of the opposition to the Accord came from less-developed countries, small island
nations, NGOs, indigenous groups, environmentalists, and other proponents of stricter regulation and
greater emission reductions because, they argued, the targets pledged in Copenhagen would fail to reach
the goal of capping the global temperature increase at 2C.22 They also criticized the Accord’s emission
reduction commitments and pledges for financing because they were voluntary (not legally-binding) and
thus, industrial nations were not required to mitigate their emissions or provide climate aid financing.23
Shortly after, President Evo Morales of Bolivia attempted to seize upon the disappointment in
Copenhagen by calling together the World People’s Conference on Climate Change (WPCCC) in
Cochabamba, Bolivia. Morales argued that the “Copenhagen Accord” was anti-democratic because it
was crafted behind closed doors without input from most of the world, primarily the voices of
environmental justice activists, NGOs, indigenous people, farmers/peasants, and national government
representatives from less-developed countries.24 He also argued that the “Copenhagen Accord” failed to
adequately address the threat of climate change because its mitigation targets were too low and adaptation
financing was minimal.25 Therefore, he invited people from around the world, especially those that were
excluded from the negotiations that led to the “Copenhagen Accord,” to come together and formulate an
alternative approach. This conference resulted in “Cochabamba” (see Chapter 3 for more specific details).
During the next UNFCCC Summit (COP16) in Cancún, Mexico in December 2010, the Bolivian
government (led by Morales) formally proposed these policies for consideration. They were rejected
because they were seen as too radical by industrialized/industrializing national governments. Instead,
COP16 resulted in “Cancún” which built off of the framework proposed in the “Copenhagen Accord” (i.e.
voluntary emission reductions and voluntary climate financing pledges). However, unlike the year earlier
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in Copenhagen when these proposals received the support of only 37 countries, Bolivia was the only
country (out of the 192 parties to the UNFCCC) to oppose “Cancún.”26 There is speculation as to why the
other governments represented at the UNFCCC shifted their support so quickly to something they had
rejected just one year earlier, but documents released by the whistle-blower website “Wikileaks” point to
diplomatic manipulation of climate-related aid by the Obama Administration as the primary reason that
many governments of poorer/less developed countries ended up lending their support.27 Specifically,
following their outspoken opposition to the “Copenhagen Accord,” the Obama Administration cut off all
climate-related aid from the US to states like Bolivia and Ecuador, while (behind closed doors) making
promises of millions of US dollars in climate aid to states like the Maldives who desperately need it (the
Maldives in particular is one of the states projected to be dramatically impacted early on by rising sea
levels because they are a low-lying small island nation).28 Other proponents of stricter climate policies
also lent their support to the “Cancún” because while they recognized it as inadequate they viewed it as a
first step towards a climate treaty that would be legally-binding in the future.29
This brief history of climate policy debates over the past few years demonstrates the political
complexity within which the modern climate debate is taking place. The UNFCCC is ultimately
responsible for deriving whatever legally-binding agreement will replace the Kyoto Protocol (if any), yet
the debate there tends to be dominated by the world’s wealthiest economies (who are also the biggest
emitters of GHG). The mere existence of the WPCCC as an alternative forum to the UNFCCC reveals
that many voices are excluded from the official debate within the UN. When the political constraints are
loosened, and climate activists and others who are arguably most affected by climate change are able to
speak, they formulate a much different policy response. As mentioned earlier, what is at the central core
of the debate between these two conferences is an understanding of “sustainable development” with
respect to the modern capitalist form of industrial development, the UNFCCC attempting to sustain the
modern neoliberal economic model and the WPCCC seeking seeking to build a countermovement to it.
Overview
The rest of this paper will be divided into 3 chapters, followed by a conclusion. Chapter 1 will
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explore the complex relationship between capitalism, climate change, and “sustainable development.” I
will first describe how fossil fuel-based industrial development is responsible for climate change. Then I
will explore six theoretical perspectives about climate change policy along a spectrum of views on
industrial development. Then I will explore how “sustainable development” is broadly understood by
these perspectives (central to this is how “need” and “nature” are conceptualized). Lastly, I will explain
how the debate between “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” can be adequately understood through the
theoretical framework of Karl Ponanyi’s “Double Movement” whereby groups dislocated by everexpanding marketization of society seek to embed market activity into larger social concerns and systems
(in this case, human and environmental rights protections).
Chapter 2 will directly compare and contrast “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” by exploring who
was in attendance at each conference, describing in detail what each policy proposes, and explaining what
the logical basis for each approach is. I will then connect this specific policy discussion together with the
theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 1 to demonstrate how the two policy proposals fit into the
larger discourses on sustainable development.
Chapter 3 will then place the climate policy debate between the “Cancún” and “Cochabamba”
within a political and economic context demonstrating that “Cochabamba” is politically unfeasible and
that, despite its inadequacy, “Cancún” is likely to emerge as the basis for future climate policy. I will
explore why this is the case by specifically focusing on how the climate negotiations have been
influenced by political power and economic interests, including state politics, energy politics, and various
political actors within global civil society. This chapter will demonstrate how the modern climate policy
debate has been disciplined by political and economic power, and again I will connect this with the larger
discourses on “sustainable development” explored in Chapters 1 and 2.
Lastly, I will conclude by revisiting the question of “what does ‘sustainable development’ mean
in the modern climate policy debate?” I will then situate this discussion within the larger debate about
ecological sustainability and capitalism, returning to some of the fundamental questions raised throughout
the discussion. Finally, I will close with what this analysis means for the future of climate policy and the
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politics surrounding development more broadly.
Chapter 1: Capitalism, Climate Change, and “Sustainable Development”
In order to adequately understand the modern climate debate it is first important to properly
understand the relationship between anthropogenic climate change, the international capitalist system, and
the concept of “sustainable development.” As outlined in the introductory chapter, I will argue that the
debate between “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” is a reflection of a larger debate about the nature and future
of capitalist development, and a reflection of Polanyi’s “Double Movement.” “Cancún” sees climate
change as a threat only insofar as it will place limits on the ability for capital to be endlessly accumulated,
and thus prescribes a climate regime made up of neoliberal mechanisms (such as further commodification
and privatization, the expansion of “free” markets, and more international trade). “Cochabamba” sees
climate change as a threat to the world’s poorest communities, and local ecosystems throughout the
world, and identifies capitalism as the root cause of climate change itself. This debate is centered on how
the two different perspectives conceptualize “development” and “sustainable development.” A key
distinction for each has to do with how “need” and “nature” are defined and understood in relation to
human society. In other words, the way in which a society understands “need” will largely determine
how they conceptualize “development,” and the way in which a society understands the relationship
between “nature” and society will largely determine how they conceptualize “sustainable development.”
For “Cancún,” human “need” is monetized and understood as the need for perpetual growth of capital
accumulation in search of profit, and “nature” is simply viewed as a an input into industrial production.
Alternatively, for “Cochabamba,” human “need” is understood more as the ability for all human beings to
have their physiological needs met, their local cultures sustained, and various “human rights” protected
while “nature” is understood as a large, diverse network of ecosystems inherently intertwined with human
cultures and well-being. Thus, “Cancún” seeks to “sustain” neoliberal, industrial capitalism while
“Cochabamba” seeks to challenge “self-regulating,” free-market capitalism and instead embed industrial
development within a climate regime based off of human and environmental rights.
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Introduction: Capitalism and Climate Change
As discussed in the Introduction, anthropogenic climate change is a result of increased emissions
of greenhouse gases (GHG) that intensify the “greenhouse effect” and lead to a rise in the earth’s average
global surface temperature. But in order to adequately understand the origins of the climate crisis one
must examine how it is inherently intertwined with models of economic development that promote
production and consumption based on energy from fossil fuels. The baseline data that climate scientists,
including the IPCC, use for comparison of GHG levels and average global surface temperatures is pre1750 and the onset of industrial development, predicated primarily upon the harnessing of energy from
burning fossil fuels.30 According to the IPCC, the chief GHG responsible for contributing to
anthropogenic climate change is carbon dioxide (CO2)31, and today’s current levels of CO2 are the highest
they have been in over 650,000 years.32 Modern carbon emissions come mainly from the process of
burning fossil fuels, primarily coal and oil, and demand for these resources has been increasing since the
dawn of the industrial era.
It is important to understand GHG emissions in the appropriate political and historical context.
The climate crisis poses a serious threat to the planet and all human beings, but the worst impacts of
climate change will likely be felt by the most vulnerable people around the world, specifically those
living in poverty.33 While the people who are most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change live in
resource-poor countries (sometimes referred to as countries of the “Third World” or “Global South”), it is
the resource-rich, “developed” countries (sometimes referred to as the “First World” or the “Global
North”) that are most responsible for the cumulative GHG emissions that are the cause of the crisis. Data
from the World Resources Institute (WRI) demonstrate in the figures below that GHGs have been
continuously rising since 1900, with most of the emissions coming from the post-World War II period
(Figure 1) and that the greatest share of historical CO2 emissions (76%) comes from “developed”
countries (primarily the US and the EU countries) when compared with “developing” countries (24%;
Figure 2). These data demonstrate that while nearly two centuries of industrial development allowed the
economies of the United States and the European Union (and more recently China and India) to generate
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Figure 1. Globa
al Emissions of
o CO2 from F
Fossil Fuels (19900-2004)34

Figure 2. Cumulativee CO2 Emissioons (1850-20022)35
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Six Theoretical Perspectives on Capitalism and Climate Change Policy
There is a wide spectrum of political interests represented in various capacities within the overall
climate policy debate. Additionally, numerous theoretical and ideological perspectives have emerged in
this complex debate. In this literature review I will provide an overview of six main perspectives for
climate policy and discuss each of them in relation to the central issue of industrial development. Then I
will place the two competing frameworks considered in this proposal (“Cancun” and “Cochabamba”)
along that spectrum of climate policy makers to frame the debate. While the climate policy debate that is
taking place at the UNFCCC is between national state governments, the perspectives considered here
span a variety of political actors (e.g. corporate business interests, human rights advocates, environmental
activists, peasants/farmers, indigenous peoples, etc.) who in turn have varying levels of political power
within their respective central governments. I will attempt to situate the debate between and “Cancún”
and “Cochabamba” within this larger spectrum.
In this section I will review six theoretical perspectives related to climate policy: 1) Climate
Change Deniers, 2) Orthodox Liberals, 3) Institutional Liberals, 4) Human Rights Advocates, 5)
Environmental Rights Advocates, and 6) Deep Ecologists.
Climate Change Deniers – Many policy makers, politicians, think tanks, and academics have
critiqued the underlying scientific basis of anthropogenic climate change. These criticisms range from
denying that there have been any recorded changes in the earth’s climate36 to denial that the observed
changes are the result of human activity.37 Others claim that the impacts of anthropogenic climate change
may actually be beneficial to certain aspects of human society, especially for wealthier countries.38
However, by now there is a wide scientific consensus that these claims are unsubstantiated and lack
credible evidence to be taken seriously. In fact, most research and policy campaigns that claim to
delegitimize the IPCC or the scientific basis for anthropogenic climate change are largely funded by
corporations or individuals with economic or political interest in preventing any form of regulation of
GHG emissions (namely, fossil fuel industries).39 There is more about this in Chapter 3.
Orthodox Liberals – This theoretical perspective is most closely aligned with advocates of a “free
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market” capitalist economic system. They recognize the legitimacy of climate science and accept that
GHG emissions are leading to increased global temperatures, however they do not blame industrial
production or capitalist economic development because they believe a “free market” operates best if it is
left to self-regulation. Therefore, they advocate for voluntary, consumer-driven, market-based solutions
to deal with climate change. Numerous authors have pointed to trends in the insurance industry that have
already begun modeling climate change and its expected impacts.40 Orthodox liberals argue that as
climate change grows worse, these costs will soon be figured into the cost of production and
consumption, therefore driving up prices and directing consumers away from GHG-emitting industries
and practices. Others have written about the emergence of “Corporate Social Responsibility” (CSR) and
the decision by leading multinational corporations to move towards more socially responsible business
models, some opting to voluntarily reduce their GHG-emissions without government regulation or market
manipulation.41 Others believe that corporations will establish “green supply chains” which will emit
fewer GHG and also reduce the cost of production due to savings in energy costs.42 Orthodox liberals
generally prefer a limited role for the government in regulating economic activity, and therefore do not
advocate a large role for the state in addressing climate change. The most government involvement
orthodox liberals are willing to advocate would be government regulation of labeling products and/or
corporations as being “green” and thus allowing consumers to decide where to spend their money.43
Institutional Liberals – Others have written about the limits that the above voluntary approaches
have, and very few believe it will adequately address the climate crisis. Instead, alternative market-based
approaches supportive of capitalist development have gained popularity. This position is perhaps best
articulated by Nicholas Stern, former Chief Economist of the World Bank (2000-2003) and was the chief
advisor to the United Kingdom on climate change and economic policy in 2007 when he was
commissioned to produce an influential report called The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern
Review, which argues that the emission of GHG is a market externality that has been excluded from
market transactions and therefore must be accounted for with government regulation.44 Stern’s marketbased approach argues that the overall cost that climate change will have on society (measured by costs of
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adaptation, losses in GDP due to extreme weather impacts, reduced agricultural output, etc.) will be
greater than the cost of properly putting into place a mitigation and adaptation regulatory regime. While
Stern has been criticized by many other liberal economists, including William Nordhaus and Robert
Mendelsohn, their critiques have largely focused on the way in which he calculated the cost to society vs.
the cost of mitigation/adaptation and thus remained within the cost-benefit analysis of a market-based
analytical approach.45 The approach advocated by some institutional liberals (those who deem the cost of
inaction to outweigh the cost of action) would be for the government to impose a mandatory cost/tax on
GHG emissions, primarily CO2, and use those funds to finance or subsidize mitigation/adaptation efforts.
This could be accomplished by establishing an international CO2 emissions trading mechanism (cap-andtrade) or a global tax on CO2 emissions. The institutional liberal approach recognizes a flaw in a marketdriven industrial economic model but believes that it is an example of market failure that could be
addressed with increased market regulation rather than abandoning the utilization of markets entirely.
Human Rights Advocates – Some analysts have criticized the way in which the above liberal
perspectives have failed to uphold basic human rights in the face of anthropogenic climatic change. A
number of scholars and policy analysts have examined the relationship between climate change and
human rights46, specifically as it relates to issues such as forced migration47 and increased vulnerability
from poverty48, or by theoretically examining the human rights of future generations and
“intergenerational justice.”49 Most of these advocates take existing human rights protections (notably, the
“Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and related human rights laws) and examine how expected
climate change impacts will affect these rights (i.e. increased food insecurity, water insecurity, forced
migration issues, etc.). While some have put forth a human rights-based approach as an alternative to
market-centered, industrial development,50 others have argued that human rights have been utilized to
justify or further entrench market mechanisms and/or private property regimes.51 Given this diversity of
perspectives, these critics do not inherently reject capitalist and/or industrial development but rather
critique it for not being able to ensure adequate human rights protections for all. Thus, they advocate for
various mechanisms of aid, increased legal protections (e.g. for forced migrants and “climate refugees”),
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or alternative models of development to ensure these protections for human populations.
One popular framework for how climate change and human rights are linked with economic
development is the Greenhouse Development Rights Framework (GDR).52 This approach acknowledges
that it is necessary to mitigate GHG emissions while at the same time recognizing that certain economies
are in better positions to do so than others. For example, some countries may experience severely
negative economic and social consequences if they are forced to cease or dramatically reduce GHG
emissions (namely, if it impedes with their ability to address poverty, hunger or other development goals).
The GDR framework evaluates countries independently and assigns different targets for GHG emissions
for each, depending on their economic capacity. This framework is seen as a more equitable way of
ensuring that climate change is adequately addressed while also recognizing that “development rights”
take precedence over GHG mitigation, thus shifting the burden or mitigation to more “developed”
countries. Another approach for addressing climate change, specifically as it relates to forced migration,
argues that the legal definition of “refugee” should be altered to include providing legal protections for
someone who is internally displaced or forced to flee their country of origin due to natural disasters
(floods, droughts, desertification, or any other extreme event resulting from anthropogenic climate
change).53 Other proponents of human rights have focused specifically on climate change and the rights
of indigenous peoples, and have called for any international climate treaty to recognize the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples54, and sometimes this approach is invoked to critique
market mechanisms such as carbon offsets that may threaten the cultural or economic rights of indigenous
peoples.55 In each of these cases, the capitalist model of industrial development is not inherently rejected;
however, it is manipulated or embedded within a larger international legal framework to ensure the
protection of individual human rights.
Environmental Rights Advocates – Some have criticized the individual human rights advocates
for being anthropocentric and individualistic, instead arguing that climate change is not only a threat to
human beings but also to other animals, plants, and/or entire ecosystems. These advocates argue that
environmental legal protections need to be put in place to protect biodiversity and the sustainability of
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ecosystems.56 Most of these advocates tend to be environmentalist organizations and/or
conservationists,C however some state governments have passed laws granting rights protections to the
environment (separate from human rights).D Similar to the individual human rights’ advocates, not all
environmental rights advocates inherently reject industrial development, but instead they broadly argue
that any model of economic development must ensure adequate environmental protections. However,
some actors have used this approach in an attempt to argue against the basic structure of market-centered
development, namely private property regimes. They have done so by arguing that market-based
development has destroyed “the commons” where human beings and other species are free to enjoy
nature without any single person, organization, or species dominating, controlling or manipulating it.57
Deep Ecologists – All of the above perspectives have either supported outright industrial
development (whether it be capitalist or socialist industry). Others have called both the market-based and
the rights-based approaches into question by arguing that any model of industrial development will be
inherently unsustainable.58 They sometimes refer to themselves as “deep ecologists,” “social ecologists”
or “social anarchists” and argue that the only way to adequately address climate change would be to move
away industrial development entirely.59 On popular advocate of this position is Vandana Shiva, an Indian
physicist, environmental activist, and self-described “eco-feminist.” In her book Soil Not Oil she argues
for an alternative approach to industrial agriculture that does not rely on fossil fuels, seeds protected by
intellectual property rights, or long supply chains but instead relies upon human labor, organic seed
production, and local distribution.60 Unlike the human rights and environmental rights advocates, deep
ecologists like Shiva directly call into question capitalist/industrial development and argue that climate
change highlights the need to alter the fundamental mechanisms underlying industrial economic growth,
such as mechanized production, private property regimes, and/or free trade.
Additionally, many of these deep ecologists are rooted in critical theories of the development
C

Notable groups include Friends of the Earth International and the Indigenous Environmental Network.
The state of Bolivia is leading in this effort, recently granting laws to grant numerous environmental rights similar to those
proposed in the “Cochabamba” agreements (to be discussed in Chapter 2). Also, the state of Kenya recently ratified a new
Constitution which grants the government the ability to protect environmental rights as a way of maintaining a healthy
environment for future generations.
D
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project more broadly. Arturo Escobar describes a “development discourse” that emerged after the Second
World War. He argues that this discourse “determines what can be thought and said” by academics,
policy makers, and political actors regarding international governance. He sees development as a
complex set of relationships “established between institutions, socioeconomic processes, forms of
knowledge, technological factors, and so on.” These relationships establish a “discursive practice that
sets the rules of the game: who can speak, from what points of view, with what authority, and according
to what criteria of expertise; it sets the rules that must be followed for this or that problem, theory or
object to emerge and be named, analyzed and eventually transformed into a policy or a plan.”61 In this
way, the discourse determines what can be characterized as “knowledge” and who can be considered an
“expert.” This discourse frames the boundaries of acceptable debate, and anyone wishing to critique the
process must do so within its narrow confines. And most importantly, this development discourse occurs
among academics, policy makers, and various other political actors. Therefore, the way in which these
actors construct development discourses determines what actually happens in the real world regarding
political and economic policy. For Escobar, and other theorists critical of “development,” the challenge is
to question the entire project of “development” in general. The way that the “development discourse” has
emerged assumes that the project of development can and must be undertaken, that there is a world that is
“undeveloped” or “underdeveloped,” and there is a world that is “developed.” Rather than find an
alterative form of development, these critics call for an alternative to development. It is a very different
way of viewing climate change than the others, and presents a key distinction found in “Cochabamba.”
As demonstrated above, there exists a large spectrum of theoretical perspectives for climate
change policy, and these perspectives are situated within larger discourses on nature, development, and
sustainability. Because climate deniers do not recognize the overwhelming scientific consensus behind
anthropogenic climate change, their perspective is not be considered in this project. The other five
perspectives will be considered. “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” draw upon multiple perspectives and
frameworks (see Figure 3) but have significantly different approaches to “sustainable development” as it
relates to climate policy.
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Figure 3. Theoretical Perspectives, Frameworks and Policy Proposals Considered in this Project

While “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” have some areas of overlap regarding their theoretical perspectives
(both, for instance, call for some elements of human rights protections), they center upon two different
mechanisms as the basis for their climate regime: the market-based approach of “Cancún” and the rightsbased approach of “Cochabamba.”
Understanding the Debate between “Cancún” and “Cochabamba”: Karl Polanyi’s Double Movement
To adequately understand the relationship between “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” it is helpful to
look to the Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “Double Movement,” as this theory adequately frames the
dynamic between the two. Polanyi looks to the enclosure movement and the Poor Law reforms of the 19th
century as the foundation for the modern institutions of private property and the labor market, both of
which are essential institutions for the modern market economy. He sees this as an important shift not
only because it forms the basis of the market economy that spurred the Industrial Revolution but also
because this economic and political shift had serious impacts on the larger society. Negative social
consequences resulted from this unprecedented market expansion because of the emergence of “fictitious
commodities.” A commodity, by definition, is something that is produced for sale on the market. Polanyi
argues that “land, labor and money are obviously not commodities; the postulate that anything that is
bought and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue in regard to them.”62 Polanyi sees
the commodification of land (during the enclosure movement) and labor (during the Poor Law Reforms) as
having profound consequences for the larger society because each are inherently part of other social
relationships. Land is linked to how people engage nature, cohabitate, or make food. Labor is an extension
of a person’s inherent creative and productive activity and is linked with many social and cultural realities.
The commodification of these socially embedded institutions allowed for a market economy to emerge,
but required the transformation of complex social, political and economic institutions and relationships.
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Polanyi describes how the emergence of a market economy had dramatic, and often negative,
impacts on society at large there is often a simultaneous movement against marketization by numerous
sectors of a society. The process of market expansion coupled with the societal response to limit this
expansion is what Polanyi describes as the “Double Movement”. Fred Block characterizes Polanyi by
arguing “that market societies are constituted by two opposing movements – the laissez-faire movement
to expand the scope of the market, and the protective countermovement that emerges to resist the
disembedding of the economy.”63 As social relationships became increasingly commodified and
marketized during the Industrial Revolution, the social relationships began to transform so dramatically
that this marketization was met with an almost equally transformative resistance. Polanyi sees the Double
Movement as the driver behind the creation of the modern liberal state in asserting that the role of the
state ought not to be the transformation of society into a market economy but rather to slow the process in
an attempt to limit the negative consequences. He writes, “the role [of the state is] often in altering the
rate of change, speeding it up or slowing it down as the case may be.”64 It is this dynamic that properly
describes “Cancún” and “Cochabamba”: “Cancún” would build upon and expand the laissez-faire
movement to expand the scope of the market and “Cochabamba” forms the protective countermovement
that is trying to resist the disembedding of the economy in an attempt to protect existing social, political,
or economic relationships that are being challenged or transformed through the marketization of society.
In juxtaposing these two proposals I will demonstrate that they are being put forth by opposing sets of
political actors who each seek to define “sustainable development” differently, based off of their own
perceived self-interests and conceptualizations of “nature” and “development.”
Conceptualizing “Sustainable Development”: Understanding “Need” and “Nature”
To understand how Polanyi’s Double Movement has shaped this debate over “sustainable
development” one must further explore the “development discourse” by and how the relationship between
how “need” is conceptualized in relation to “development” and how “nature” is conceptualized in relation
to “sustainable development.” These elements of the “development discourse” are key to understanding
the distinctions between “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” with relation to the modern climate policy debate:
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“Cancún” understands “need” as the need to satisfy perpetual growth for the international capitalist
system, and views “nature” as merely an input into that process. “Cochabamba” attempts to challenge
those basic conceptualizations and instead focus on fulfilling a range of human needs (from physiological
needs and “human rights” to the preservation of local human cultures in relation to “nature”).
Development and “Need”
How are we to understand human “need”? This section will examine two opposing views. The
first is within the school of utilitarianism, which understands human needs as clearly objective and
natural, and measured through market valuations. Utilitarians such as Thomas Malthus, most famous for
his contribution to population studies, argued that an “equilibrium” would be reached in society between
food resources and the size of the human population. If food were not available, then people would starve
to death, thus establishing this equilibrium. Any attempt to intervene in this equilibrium would lead to
overpopulation, and be unsustainable. This was expanded by upon by Jeremy Bentham who promoted a
plan to remove welfare systems from feeding people who were not working in order to force them into a
cheap labor market or starve.65 While the focus here is on distributing resources and creating a cheap
labor market, the idea is that human need is objectively defined and natural: food and physiological
resources, all of which can be measured monetarily. Gary Becker expands on this with “rational choice”
theory, which essentially states that individuals will “rationally” choose to pursue their own needs (or
“interests”), but most importantly that market rationale can measure, understand, and explain this in
nearly all areas of human decision making.66 Here, human “need” is defined and understood through an
entirely utilitarian form of market-logic.
A second understanding of human “need” comes from within critical schools (both postdevelopmentalist and Marxist), which understand human “need” as dependent upon social
conceptualizations and historical circumstance and framed within competing interests to define what
“need” is or ought to be. Post-developmentalist and Marxist critical theorists do not understand human
“need” in terms of strict market valuation of objectively defined criteria (like food), but instead situate
conceptualizations of need within social relationships and structures. Post-developmentalists such as
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Arturo Escobar argues that “need” has been monetized and marketized within the “development
discourse” around poverty, the modern understanding of which is a socially constructed concept that
reflects a Western, commodified understanding of “need.” That is, poverty defined as having little or no
income to purchase necessary goods.67 A similar idea is put forth by Ashis Nandy who further
deconstructs the idea of poverty by drawing a sharp distinction between “poverty” and “destitution.”
Poverty is a phenomenon that has always been with us – some people have less material wealth than
others. Modern “poverty” is a monetized notion that understands well-being as material wealth, most
commonly measured through market value. This is different than “destitution,” which is a more
contemporary phenomenon altogether different than poverty. Destitution describes the complete absence
of human necessities: food and water, shelter from extreme conditions. As Nandy points out, throughout
much of history a person could be poor (i.e. lacking material wealth) but not live a life of destitution.
Escobar, Nandy, and others have critiqued the entire project of “development” as being inherently
misguided because the entire discourse around human need has been monetized. Alternatively, Marxists
like David Harvey have characterized the system of capitalism as requiring perpetual growth at a
compound rate in order to survive, often resulting in relentless competition and various crises.68 Market
expansion becomes an imperative for the very survival of the system, regardless of who is directing the
project.E For Harvey, “need” is defined as the need for capitalism to expand perpetually. In each instance,
the post-developmentalists and Marxists both understand that “need” is socially constructed.
Sustainable Development and “Nature”
The way in which one conceptualizes “need” determines how they conceptualize “development.”
Utilitarians define “need” in strictly objective and monetary terms, and thus understand development as
the project of expanding income and economic growth, regardless of local understandings of need, or
existing social relationships or structures. Critical theorists like Escobar and Nandy critique that
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Harvey explains how capitalism has evolved over the past few centuries in this vein: First industrial development sought to
commodify nature and labor. Then capital continues to search for new sectors to expand to, so capitalist countries begin
aggressively pursuing and opening up emerging markets in the “developing” world. Later, large portions of the US and
European economies undergo massive financialization, and financial markets expand dramatically, etc.
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understanding of “development” and the modern “development discourse” for misunderstanding and
marketizing the concept of “need.” For Marxists like Harvey, “need” is merely understood as the need
for perpetual growth of capital accumulation. In a similar fashion, critiquing “sustainable development”
requires us to focus on how “nature” has also been marketized and/or commodified, and “sustainable
development” policies have largely been framed through this lens.
There is a considerable lengthy literature, mostly in the field of political ecology, that critically
examines how the market has affected various conceptualizations of “nature” and the “nature-society”
relationship, and what this means for “sustainability.” The plant biologist, A.G. Tansley, has argued for
what is called an “ecosystem concept” in which all aspects of an ecosystem “organic and inorganic,
biome and habitat – may be regarded as interacting factors which, in a mature ecosystem, are in
approximate equilibrium.” Roderick Neumann points out that a key assumption in this approach to
sustainability is “that ecosystems are characterized by homeostasis and equilibrium.”69 This became an
approach that was attractive to many human geographers and anthropologists who sought to argue that
human cultures developed adaptations over time to be at “equilibrium” with their environments.
Therefore, under this understanding of nature-society relations, sustainability would mean returning to
those cultural adaptations that ensure that an ecosystem maintains an equilibrium balance between
humans and their non-human environment. Other geographers, such as Michael Watts, have critiqued
this approach because it distinguishes between two different spheres: human and environment. Watts
criticizes the use of biological metaphors for understanding ecosystem in equilibrium, and instead argues
to look through the lens of how political economy has shaped this relationship instead. Doing so allows
one to understand not how human-nature relationships more fully and then more appropriately understand
sustainable development policy as an extension of this.
Philosopher Slavoj Zizek continues this analytical line of thought in arguing that “Nature does not
exist.” In other words, there is no perfect, balanced equilibrium-based “Nature” that needs to be sustained
because “Nature” is constantly in flux and constantly evolving in relation to human society. Rob Krueger
and David Gibbs argue that framing the debate in this way “avoids asking the politically sensitive but
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vital question as to what kind of socioenvironmental arrangements we wish to produce, how these can be
achieved, and what sort of natures we wish to inhabit.”70 Rather, it is more adequate to understand the
relationship between human society and nature as constantly in flux, both affecting one another all the
time, and constantly changing together. This conceptualization of the nature-society relationship asks a
fundamentally different question with regards to “sustainability” by recognizing that multiple concepts of
“nature” exist, and it is up to each society and their policy makers to determine which one ought to be
sustained. For this reason, Krueger and Gibbs argue that modern “sustainable development” policies that
often take precedence among today’s neoliberal policy makers are “those that prioritize the value of
capital and the maintenance of existing patterns of social relations.”71 Here, one can theoretically
understand how the “development discourse” has framed not only the debate around “development” but
also “sustainable development,” both relating to how society conceptualizes “need” and “nature.”
Arturo Escobar presents a more concrete example of how these dynamics have played out in the
debate around “sustainable development” in his call for a “poststructural” political ecology.72 He points
to the “Brundtland Report,” a result of the UN World Commission on Environment and Development,
which famously defined “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present
without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.”73 Specifically, he critiques
modern notions of “sustainable development” by emphasizing what James O’Connor calls the “second
contradiction of capitalism”74 and then claims that the “new” project of sustainable development is really
just a continuation of the “old” project of capitalist development. The “contradiction” upon which he
centers his analysis is a result of capitalism’s commodification of nature in which it is incorporated as
capital into the production process, resulting in the destruction of nature. This therefore limits
capitalism’s ability to expand. Driven by competition for increased profits between individuals or firms,
capitalism requires growth and expansion in order to survive. Thus, it is a “contradiction” because it
destroys a necessary input into the production process: commodified nature. Escobar argues that the
Western notion of “sustainable development,” articulated and popularized by the Brundtland Report, was
primarily concerned with addressing this inherent contradiction in capitalist development rather than
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some altruistic drive to sustain nature, culture, or ecosystems. He writes that the Bundtland Report
attempts to reconcile “two old enemies – economic growth and preservation of the environment – without
significant adjustments to the market system.” Thus, he concludes that in the sustainable development
discourse, “nature is reinvented as environment so that capital, not nature and culture, may be
sustained.”75 Krueger and Gibbs echo the same sentiment, arguing that “instead of throwing a wrench
into the capitalist machine, sustainability subsequently gets redefined as one of the possible routes for a
neoliberal renewal of the capitalist accumulation process.”76 Here, “environment” is meant to reflect
commodified nature – something that human society manages and/or controls – and “sustainable
development” is simply a project seeking to continue the project of capitalist development by addressing
the second contradiction of capitalism and thus allowing for sustainable accumulation of capital despite
its negative impact on nature.
Chapter 1 Conclusion
In this chapter I introduced how climate change has inherently been intertwined with industrial
capitalist development. Not only has industrial capitalist development led to the significant rise in GHG
emissions that cause climate change, but it has also fundamentally transformed how human societies
conceptualize “need” and “nature.” Capitalism has monetized “need” and defined them in exclusively
market terms, placing the imperative for perpetual economic growth above all else. It has also
fundamentally transformed the relationship between human societies and nature, commodifying “nature”
as an input into the industrial production process, ignoring all other forms of physical or cultural
conceptualizations of human “need” and “nature” that any given society may have. As the next Chapter
will demonstrate, this is the main critique of “Cancún” put forth by “Cochabamba.” Critiques argue that
“Cancún” approaches the issue of climate change strictly through a capitalist lens, seeing the issue a
possible hindrance to perpetual growth and capital accumulation while ignoring other human and
environmental needs. As the next Chapter will demonstrate, the critical theories discussed in this Chapter
are embraced by the “Cochabamba” proposals as they seek to build a countermovement to capitalism,
opening the climate policy debate to more fundamental questions of political and economic governance.
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Chapter 2: “Cancún Agreements” v. the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba”
Chapter 1 introduced the way critique of “sustainable development” and provided key theoretical
frameworks for examining the modern sustainable development discourse surrounding the climate change
policy debate. Specifically, the spectrum of theoretical perspectives considered have to do with the way
in which neoliberal, industrial capitalism has contributed to climate policy, and to what extent that system
should be involved in any future climate regime. These dynamics have framed the debate not only in
terms of how to mitigate the emission of GHGs (At what level should GHG emissions be capped? How
should mitigation occur?) but also how to adapt to climate changes (What adaptations ought to be made?
How should adaptation be financed? Who should be responsible for making these decisions?). In the
Chapter that follows I will demonstrate, through an in-depth analysis of the various components of each
agreement, how the “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” embody these differing approaches to “sustainable
development.” I will argue that the “Cancún” is designed to sustain neoliberalism with a market-based
approach to climate policy while “Cochabamba” is designed to challenge neoliberalism with a rightsbased approach to climate policy.
In this Chapter I will focus on three main areas in comparing/contrasting these competing
proposals: 1) the political actors represented within the UNFCCC v. the WPCCC; 2) the policy proposals
themselves and how they address mitigation, adaptation, and climate regime governance; and 3) the
logical basis behind each set of proposals, namely the market-environmentalist approach of the “Cancún”
v. the rights-based approach of “Cochabamba.” This analysis will demonstrate that the modern climate
policy debate occurring between advocates of the “Cancún” and advocates of the “People’s Agreement of
Cochabamba” is an embodiment of the critiques of “development” and “sustainable development” that
were explored in Chapter 1.
Political Actors
If one is to adequately understand how and why “Cancún” differs from “Cochabamba” it is
important to first understand who is represented at each of the summits that produced them (the UNFCCC
which produced “Cancún” v. the WPCCC which produced “Cochabamba”). Who were the political
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actors present at each conference? How were decisions about climate policy made? Whose political and
economic interests do they represent? The answers to these questions will paint a very stark contrast
between the political actors involved in crafting each set of policy proposals: Most of the world’s political
and economic elite are very well represented within the UNFCCC, while many less-powerful groups such
as indigenous people, grassroots environmental activists, and climate justice advocates felt excluded from
that process and thus participated in the alternative WPCCC. Given whose interests were represented
within each conference it is easy to see how “Cancún” reflects a climate policy designed to sustain the
dominant neoliberal model of economic development while “Cochabamba” challenges that model and
advocates for an alternative approach empowering the groups represented there.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
The UNFCCC was created in 1992 to be the legally-recognized body within the United Nations
responsible for drafting international climate change policy. Since 1995 the UNFCCC has held annual
“Conference of Parties” (COP) summits to move the climate policy debate forward. The political actors
represented at the UNFCCC that are responsible for crafting climate policy there are representatives of
the member states of the UN. In order for the UNFCCC to officially agree upon a climate policy proposal,
all member states must unanimously consent to it, which makes reaching consensus a political challenge.
Drafting international climate change policy is admittedly a very complex process, with varying
political and economic interests represented from the diverse array of every state government in the UN
represented. However, the two most influential political actors within the debate at the UNFCCC are
arguably the United States and China. Together, these two states are the two largest economies in the
world and simultaneously the two greatest emitters of GHGs in the world.77 For this reason, they largely
determine the parameters of the climate policy debate because any agreement that does not have their
cooperation will inherently be ineffective at reducing global GHG emissions or mobilizing enough
financing for adaptation and mitigation efforts around the world. This is largely why the “Copenhagen
Accord,” which was originally an agreement that was reached between the US and China (and endorsed
by Brazil, India and South Africa), eventually became the foundation for “Cancún.” Thus, “Cancún” can
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adequately be understood as an agreement between the US and Chinese governments, with reluctant
support from many other member states of the UN who were critical of the agreement but ultimately lent
their support in order to move the debate forward.78
While the UNFCCC’s decision-making process is officially controlled by representatives of the
member states of the UN, it is not accurate to say that they are the only influence in the debate. Indeed,
many political actors from civil society are also given the opportunity to participate in the debate. These
include NGOs, multinational corporations, and other private sector actors. While they cannot make the
final decision about climate policy, they are able to participate in the COP16 summit as delegates, submit
their own policy analyses, and lobby state governments to represent their perspectives in the debate.
Arguably, the two most influential groups from civil society that have the greatest amount of influence
within the UNFCCC are the bigger and well-funded environmental NGOs (such as Greenpeace, the Sierra
Club, and the World Wildlife Fund) and larger energy multinational corporations (such as fossil fuel
companies like BP, Chevron, Exxon Mobile, and Royal Dutch Shell). Other groups, such as more
radical/grassroots environmentalist organizations or alterative energy corporations, can also participate,
but given that the UNFCCC is so largely dominated by elite political and economic interests only the
largest and most well-funded groups within civil society can yield much influence.79
The COP16 summit in Cancún comprised of 12,000 participants. Of them, 5,200 were
government officials, 5,400 were representatives of UN bodies, international organizations, or NGOs, and
1,270 were members of the media. It was at this summit that “Cancún” was officially adopted. The
UNFCCC calls this agreement the “most far-reaching international response to climate change the world
has ever seen.”80 The agreement is essentially a formal adoption of the “Copenhagen Accord” that was
proposed one year earlier. The “Copenhagen Accord” failed to receive support from even a majority of
UNFCCC member states; therefore it was only “noted” and not officially passed as an agreement. It is
significant to point out that “Cancún” also failed to receive unanimous consent because the government of
Bolivia refused to endorse it, but through a procedural maneuver by the Mexican government hosting the
COP16 summit the “Cancún Agreements” formally passed and they became the official agreement.81
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Given the political actors represented within the UNFCCC it is not surprising that “Cancún”
largely represent the political and economic interests of the world’s most powerful state governments,
governments geopolitically aligned with them, with influence from large multinational energy companies
and bigger environmental NGOs. For this reason, there have been many criticisms leveled at the
UNFCCC for excluding the voices of less-politically powerful groups, for not being democratic, or for
being an ineffective venue for drafting international climate change policy. Perhaps the most vocal
advocate of this position is Evo Morales, President of Bolivia. After the failure at COP15 in Copenhagen,
Morales called for the “World People’s Conference on Climate Change” (WPCCC) as an alternative
venue to propose an alternative approach to climate policy.
World People’s Conference on Climate Change (WPCCC)
After the COP15 summit in Copenhagen in 2009 Evo Morales called the “Copenhagen Accord” a
failure and criticized the UNFCCC for being anti-democratic and unrepresentative. In an Op-Ed published
in the Los Angeles Times Morales called on people of the world to participate in the WPCCC as an
alterative to the UNFCCC negotiations:
When I arrived at the United Nations climate summit in Copenhagen in late last year, the first
thing that struck me were environmental activists braving the freezing weather to voice their
disappointment at being locked out of the largest ever international meeting on climate change.
Inside the conference, I realized that Bolivia was in a position similar to that of the protesters
outside. We, the representatives of the majority of the world’s peoples, were effectively being left
in the cold while a tiny group dominated by a few rich governments met in private to produce an
unacceptable compromise… Bolivia will not accept an agreement reached between the world’s
biggest polluters that is based on the exclusion of the very countries, communities and peoples
who will suffer most from the consequences of climate change.82

Here, Morales characterizes the UNFCCC as being dominated by rich governments who are most
responsible for climate change while excluding the voices of the majority of the world’s people, most of
whom are coincidentally the least responsible for climate change but most vulnerable to its impacts.
Additionally, the style that Morales uses to talk about these issues reflects his goal of casting
himself as the crusader of the people of the world on the issue of climate change. He draws upon his
experience as the first indigenous president in Bolivia, and the only indigenous president in South
America, to give credence to his ability to speak on behalf of others. In the same Op-Ed he writes, “as an
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indigenous leader from Bolivia, I know what exclusion looks like… [Bolivia] is committed to ending the
colonialism, racism and exclusion that many of our people lived under for many centuries.”83 Here,
Morales is articulating an argument similar to that of Arturo Escobar by equating the climate negotiations
and their proposed policies as a continuation of colonialism, racism and exclusion. Of course it is
important to understand that Morales himself is not the sole proponent of “Cochabamba,” he is instead a
representative of his political party and the segment of the Bolivian population that elected him. There are
large social movements throughout global civil society that called for this alternative conference, and
Morales was merely the prominent voice who brought these critiques to the international stage.
The WPCCC was held just outside Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2011. There were over 31,000
participants from over 140 countries, and 48 governments were formally represented by either heads of
state or other government officials.84 Most participants were representatives of environmental justice
organizations, indigenous peoples, small farmers, and other individuals and organizations who felt
excluded from the UNFCCC process. All participants were free to participate in any of 17 different
Working Groups that covered a range of topics related to climate change policy. Each Working Group
reached consensus on their climate policy proposals, and together they make up “Cochabamba.”
The people and organizations present at the WPCCC were very different than the representatives
at the UNFCCC, and this is evidenced by the remarkably different approach to climate policy advocated
by each resulting set of proposals. “Cancún” reflects the interests of the world’s most powerful state
governments (primarily those such as the US, the EU, China, and India, but also other state governments
geopolitically aligned with them), and the most influential civil society actors (large environmental
organizations and energy companies) while “Cochabamba” reflects the interests the Bolivian state and the
often-excluded voices from civil society (indigenous peoples, small farmers, and other environmental
justice advocates). The next section will describe the two policy proposals and will explain how they are
reflective of the different political and economic interests of the participants from each conference.
Policy Proposals
“Cancún” and “Cochabamba” both seek to address climate change through the general framework
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of mitigation and adaptation. However, the way they seek to achieve these goals and the overall
framework for climate regime governance are remarkably different (see Figure 4).
“Cancún Agreements”
“People’s Agreement of Cochabamba”
1. Background on Understanding Anthropogenic Climate Change
-Recognize the legitimacy of IPCC scientists and GHG
-Recognize the legitimacy of IPCC scientists and GHG
emissions as the cause of anthropogenic climate change
emissions as the cause of anthropogenic climate change,
but argue that this is a direct result of capitalist
production
2. Goal of Allowable Global Temperature Increase
-Establishes a goal of global temperature increases of
-Establishes a goal of a global temperature increase of
no-greater than 1.0C
no-greater than 2.0C
-Recognizes the need to consider in the future a goal of
no-greater than 1.5C
3. Mitigation of GHG Emissions
-Calls on industrialized countries to submit their own
-Calls on industrialized countries to reduce their GHG
GHG emission reduction targets
emissions by 50% of 1990 levels between 2012-2017
-Makes GHG emission reduction voluntary
-Makes GHG emission reduction mandatory
-Allows for the use of “carbon offsets”
-Bans the use of “carbon offsets”
4. Role of Carbon Markets
-Calls upon the UNFCCC to create market-based and
-Explicitly bans the use of any market-based
non-market-based mechanisms in the future
mechanisms
5. Climate Regime Financing
-Calls for financing from the public and private sources
-Calls for financing from public sources only
-Creates the “Green Climate Fund” and invites the
-Explicitly bans the World Bank from being used for
World Bank to be Trustee
climate financing, and calls for an independent agency to
-Pledges “climate aid” of $10bn annually from 2010be created for climate finance administration
2012 and $100bn annually starting in 2020
-Demands “climate debt” of 6% of global GDP annually
6. The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer
-Calls upon the UNFCCC to create technology transfer
-Calls for technology transfer mechanisms free from any
mechanisms that include intellectual property rights
intellectual property rights
7. Forest Management Policy
-Continues the use of the REDD mechanisms
-Explicitly bans the use of REDD mechanisms
-Notes that the rights of indigenous people should be
-Challenges any definition of “forest” that would define
accounted for during implementation of REDD
it as a monoculture plantation
8. The Role of Agriculture Policy in Climate Change Policy
-No mention of agriculture policy
-Calls for the promotion of local, sustainable, organic
agriculture as a solution to climate change
9. Other Special Legal Considerations for the Climate Regime
-Notes the “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
-Mandates that the “Declaration on the Rights of
Peoples” as part of a final climate regime
Indigenous Peoples” be central to final climate regime
-No special legal consideration for climate migrants
-Creates a legal classification for “climate migrants”
-Calls for the adoption of the “Declaration on the Rights
-No mention or establishment of environmental rights
of Mother Earth” establishing environmental rights
-Establishes a “Climate and Environmental Justice
Tribunal” with legally-binding authority to enforce the
climate regime and environmental rights
Figure 4. Summary of the “Cancún Agreements” and “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba”

This section will describe the components of each agreement in relation to the 9 key areas of climate
policy addressed by each agreement: 1) Background on Understanding Anthropogenic Climate Change,
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2) the Goal for Allowable Global Temperature Increase, 3) Mitigation of GHG Emissions, 4) Role of
Carbon Markets 5) Climate Regime Financing, 6) Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology
Transfer, 7) Forests Management Policy, 8) Role of Agriculture in Climate Policy, and 9) Other Special
Legal Considerations for the Climate Regime.
Background on Understanding Anthropogenic Climate Change
Both agreements begin with their understanding of climate change’s origins and impacts:
Recognizing that climate change represents an urgently and potentially irreversible threat to human
societies and the planet, and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties. Affirming the the
legitimate need of developing country Parties for the achievement of sustained economic growth
and the eradication of poverty, so as to be able to deal with climate change. Noting… that the
adverse effects of climate change have a range of direct and indirect implications for the effective
enjoyment of human rights… [The COP] recognizes that the warming of the climate system is
unequivocal and that most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid
twentieth century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas
concentrations, as assessed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its Fourth
Assessment Report.
-Cancún Agreements85
If global warming increases by more than 2 degrees Celsius… there is a 50% probability that the
damages caused to our Mother Earth will be completely irreversible. Between 20% and 30% of
species would be in danger of disappearing. Large extensions of forest would be affected, droughts
and floods would affect different regions of the planet, deserts would expand, and the melting of
the polar ice caps and the glaciers in the Andes and Himalayas would worsen. Many island states
would disappear, and Africa would suffer an increase in temperature of more than 3 degrees
Celsius. Likewise, the production of food would diminish in the world, causing catastrophic
impact on the survival of inhabitants from vast regions in the planet, and the number of people in
the world suffering from hunger would increase dramatically, a figure that already exceeds 1.02
billion people. The corporations and governments of the so-called “developed” countries, in
complicity with a segment of the scientific community, have led us to discuss climate change as a
problem limited to the rise in temperature without questioning the cause, which is the capitalist
system. We confront the terminal crisis of a civilizing model that is patriarchal and based on the
submission and destruction of human beings and nature that accelerated since the industrial
revolution. The capitalist system has imposed on us a logic of competition, progress and limitless
growth. This regime of production and consumption seeks profit without limits, separating human
beings from nature and imposing a logic of domination upon nature, transforming everything into
commodities: water, earth, the human genome, ancestral cultures, biodiversity, justice, ethics, the
rights of peoples, and life itself. Under capitalism, Mother Earth is converted into a source of raw
materials, and human beings into consumers and a means of production, into people that are seen
as valuable only for what they own, and not for what they are. Capitalism… is an imperialist
system of colonization of the planet.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba86

The contrast between how each of the agreements frame the issue of climate change is quite significant in
that it reflects the views of the different participants that put them together, and demonstrative of the
critiques of “development” discussed in Chapter 2. “Cancún” sees climate change as a threat to
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“development” that is defined as the ability to alleviate poverty (i.e. a marketized understanding of
poverty), and the ability of global economic growth to continue perpetually, with mention also how
implications for inhibiting individual human rights. It also make direct reference to the IPCC’s Fourth
Assessment Report (discussed in detail in the Introduction of this paper) and argue that climate change is
a result of “anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.” By contrast, the “People’s Agreement of
Cochabamba” sees climate change as a threat to ecosystems throughout the planet and a threat human
beings in specific locations of people that are most vulnerable to impacts of climate change (e.g. people of
the Andes mountains, Africans, people who suffer from hunger, etc.). It references much of the same
climate-related data that is found within the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, but directly calls into
question the de-politicized assertion of the IPCC that the cause of climate change is merely anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, they directly argue that these emissions, and the climate crisis more
broadly, are a result of industrial capitalist development, a system that requires the commodification of
everything for the pursuit of limitless production and consumption. Capitalist development is portrayed as
a neo-colonial project that threatens nature, humanity, and the human-nature relationship.
Goal for Allowable Global Temperature Increase
Each of the agreements also have specific goals for climate change mitigation, which are
measured by the goal for allowable average global temperature increases ought to be:
Further recognizes that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required… with a view
to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average
temperature below 2C above pre-industrial levels… Also recognizes the need to consider…
strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge,
including in relation to global average temperature rise of 1.5C.
-Cancún Agreements87
Our vision is based on the principle of historical common but differentiated responsibilities, to
demand the developed countries to commit with quantifiable goals of emission reduction that will
allow to return the concentration of greenhouse gases to 300 ppm, therefore the increase in the
average world temperature to a maximum of 1.0C.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba88

Here, “Cancún” places the goal for allowable global temperature increase at 2C, while the
“Cochabamba” places it much lower, at 1C. First is that average global temperatures have already
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increased from pre-industrial levels by 0.74°C.89 Given this, it is not altogether clear if it is even possible
to reach the 1C goal identified in “Cochabamba” (see Figure 5 below). The second point to note is that
“Cancún” does not assign a specific target for allowable level of CO2 (measured in parts per million, or
ppm) but instead argues that the temperature goal should be “on the basis with the best available scientific
knowledge.” By contrast the “Cochabamba” specifically cites stabilization at 300ppm.
Change in CO2
Average Temperature
Emissions in 2050
Increase from Pre(from 2000 levels)
Industrial Equilibrium
1
350-400
2000-2015
-85% to -50%
2.0°C - 2.4°C
2
400-440
2000-2020
-60% to -30%
2.4°C - 2.8°C
3
440-485
2010-2030
-30% to +5%
2.8°C - 3.2°C
4
485-570
2020-2060
+10% to +60%
3.2°C - 4.0°C
5
570-660
2050-2080
+25% to +85%
4.0°C - 4.9°C
6
660-790
2060-2090
+90% to +140%
4.9°C - 6.1°C
Figure 5. Mitigation Scenarios and Projected Increase in Average Global Temperature90
Scenario

CO2 Concentration
Stabilization (ppm)

Peak Year for CO2
Emissions (year)

By not stating a specific concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere, “Cancún” leaves open for
debate what the final cap on GHG emissions ought to be, and this may be in line with the level of doubt in
the scientific community. The IPCC details various scenarios of CO2 stabilization, peak year for CO2
emissions, and the corresponding increase in global temperatures that would likely result. Based on this,
the Cochabamba goal of a 1.0°C reduction would appear to be impossible.
This is perhaps the best example of how some of the WPCCC participants challenge or politicize
some of the findings of the scientific community, without directly calling into question the entire field of
climate science. As stated in the previous section, “Cochabamba” does echo most of the scientific
findings articulated by the IPCC, but they also argue that “a segment of the scientific community” is
complicit with “corporations and world governments.” This is one key area where this because apparent,
with “Cochabamba” calling for emission reductions below what is even calculated as a possible scenario
by the IPCC, thus arguing for a much more immediate and dramatic reduction in GHG emissions.
Mitigation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
In addition to debating the overall goal for GHG concentrations, the two agreements also have
very different strategies for how mitigation ought to occur:
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Acknowledging that the largest share of historical global emissions of greenhouse gases originated
in developed countries, and that owing to historical responsibility, developed country Parties must
take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof… [the COP] takes note
of quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets to be implemented by Parties included in
Annex 1 to the Convention as communicated by them…
Developed countries should submit annual greenhouse gas inventories and inventory reports… on
their progress in achieving emission reductions, including information on mitigation actions to
achieve their quantified economy-wide emissions targets and emission reductions achieved…
[The COP] invites developing country Parties to submit to the secretariat information on nationally
appropriate mitigation actions for which they are seeking support, along with estimated costs and
emission reductions, and the anticipated time frame for implementation.
-Cancún Agreements91
[The next COP] should approve an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol for the second commitment
period from 2013 to 2017 under which developed countries must agree to significant domestic
emissions reductions of at least 50% based on 1990 levels… The United States, as the only Annex
1 country on Earth that did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, has a responsibility toward all peoples of
the world to ratify this document…
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba92

Here, “Cancún” proposes a number of mechanisms to move forward with international mitigation efforts.
First, they recognize that the primary burden for mitigation lies with “developed” countries (i.e. “Annex 1
countries” if one were to use the language found within the UNFCCC). Second, they call for each
country to submit their own mitigation targets to the UNFCCC. Third, they call on all the UNFCCC to
establish a system for monitoring and evaluating mitigation efforts, but entirely through self-reporting
from each nation. It is important to note that within “Cancún” the mitigation targets submitted by each
country are entirely voluntary, and the monitoring and evaluation of country-wide progress towards these
goals is also entire self-reported and voluntary. By contrast, “Cochabamba” calls for a recommitment to
the Kyoto Protocol, which is a legally binding treaty requiring mandatory emissions reductions through
2012. By calling for a second recommitment period under the Kyoto protocol, and specifically calling
upon the US to ratify it, they are calling for mandatory emission reductions.
Additionally, the amount of emissions reductions that “Cochabamba” calls for are significantly
larger than the commitments referred to in “Cancún.” Because “Cancún” does not require mandatory
reductions, or assign different reductions to any Party, each country may submit their own targets
individually. For instance, the United States (the 2nd largest emitter of global GHGs) has pledged to
reduce their 2005 emissions by 17% by the year 2020, which would amount to a mere 4% reduction of
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1990 levels (it is important to note that the Kyoto Protocol, and most of the countries submitting
emissions reductions targets use 1990 as a baseline, but the United States and others, including China, use
2005 because emissions were much greater and thus using it as a baseline allows for smaller absolute
reductions). An independent scientific analysis of the current submissions (as recent as September 2011)
that have been made to the UNFCCC since “Cancún” has demonstrated the relatively small amount of
reductions that have been pledged. This analysis concludes that if targets are reached in accordance with
each county’s submissions, the overall temperature increase would be 4.3°C, as compared to 5.0°C if
there is “business as usual.” Both of these fall dramatically short of the stated 2-1.5°C goal for
“Cancún.”93 Therefore, “Cochabamba” would call for dramatically higher mandatory emissions
reeducations than the voluntary commitments from “Cancún.”F This is especially apparent with respect to
the United States, which would reduce GHG emissions by 50% under 1990 levels by 2017 under
“Cochabamba” as compared to a 4% reduction of 1990 levels by 2020 under “Cancún.”
Role of Carbon Markets
The “Cancún Agreements” and the “Peoples Agreement of Cochabamba” differ in their
mitigation policy not only in relation to what level of GHG emissions ought to be permissible in the
global atmosphere but also in regards to how mitigation will occur. The primary disagreement has to do
with whether or not, and to what extent, carbon markets ought to be utilized in the process of GHG
mitigation:
Decides to consider the establishment… of one or more market-based mechanisms to enhance the
cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions…
Undertakes… to maintain and build upon existing mechanisms, including those established under
the Kyoto Protocol…
Decides to consider the establishment… of one or more non-market-based mechanisms to enhance
the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions.
-Cancún Agreements94
The carbon market has become a lucrative business, commodifying our Mother Earth. It is
therefore not an alternative for tackle climate change, as it loots and ravages the land, water, and
F

The mechanisms through which these “mandatory” emissions would be legally-binding are not as strong, even in
the Kyoto Protocol. “Cochabamba” creates an “Environmental Justice Tribunal” within the UN with legally-binding
power to prosecute anyone who exceeds allowable emissions targets, but the effectiveness of this mechanism is
debatable. Most successful environmental treaties require domestic enforcement within local state governments, and
there are varying degrees of adherence.
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even life itself… The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that the market is incapable of
regulating the financial system, which is fragile and uncertain due to speculation and the
emergence of intermediary brokers. Therefore, it would be totally irresponsible to leave in their
hands the care and protection of human existence and of our Mother Earth. We consider
inadmissible that current negotiations propose the creation of new mechanisms that extend and
promote the carbon market, for existing mechanisms have not resolved the problem of climate
change nor led to real and direct actions to reduce greenhouse gases.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba95

“Cancún” relies significantly upon carbon markets to address mitigation of GHG emissions. It calls for
the creation of new market mechanisms for mitigation purposes, as well as the continuation of existing
carbon market mechanisms already in place from the Kyoto Protocol. The most significant mechanism
created in the Kyoto Protocol is arguably the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Under this
mechanism, Annex 1 (i.e. “developed”) countries may “offset” their emissions by investing “clean
development,” or low-carbon emitting, projects in non-Annex 1 (i.e. “under-developed”) countries. The
CDM currently constitutes the largest international market-based mechanism for GHG mitigation.
“Cancún” proposes that the main purpose for these mechanisms is to support “cost-effective” mitigation.
“Cochabamba” explicitly rejects the use of any carbon markets mechanisms for GHG mitigation.
First, they argue against the commodification of pollution because it leads to further environmental
degradation by further commodifying nature. Through commodification, the “right” to pollute becomes
enshrined in the economic process because one is able to purchase land, air, or some other commodified
form of nature and practice exclusive control over it. Second, they argue that markets are inefficient and
unreliable at reducing GHG emissions. They give the example of the carbon markets that have been
created, like the EU carbon market and the various carbon markets established by the Kyoto Protocol,
which both have failed to reach the desired mitigation targets. Lastly, they critique carbon markets for
facilitating “carbon offsets” which “mask the failure of actual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.”96
Here, the explicit rejection of carbon offsets places the responsibility for mitigation of GHG emissions on
each of the polluting Annex 1 countries instead of allowing them to continue polluting and merely
“offsetting” these by making cheaper investments in non-Annex 1 countries.
Climate Regime Financing
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Both “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” establish a system for financing mitigation and adaptation.
They both establish a system where Annex 1 countries transfer funds to non-Annex 1 countries. This
topic is expansive and encompasses financing for numerous projects, including everything from funding
mitigation efforts (such as constructing renewable energy power plants, retrofitting existing power plants
and factories to reduce emissions, or preventing deforestation or forest degredation) to financing
adaptation projects in areas impacted by climatic change (such as the building of dykes around low-lying
areas, constructing/re-constructing irrigation systems to prevent agricultural losses from reduced rainfall,
increased disaster response preparedness for extreme weather events, increased public health
infrastructures for areas affected by the spread of illnesses related to climate change, etc.). The specifics
of which projects would receive funding, or mechanisms for exactly how, have yet to be determined.
Right now the debate is centered on how much financing would be mobilized, where this financing would
come from, who will administer this financing, and how it would be distributed:
Takes note of the collective commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional
resources… approaching USD 300 billion for the period 2010-2012…
Decides that… adequate funding shall be provided to developing country Parties, taking into
account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change…
Recognizes that develop country Parties commit… to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion
per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries…
Decides that a significant share of new multilateral funding for adaptation should flow through the
Green Climate Fund…
Decides to establish a Green Climate Fund, to be designated as an operating entity of the financial
mechanism of the Convention…
Also decides that the Fund shall be governed by a board of 24 members comprising an equal
number of members from developing and developed country Parties…
Invites the World Bank to serve as the interim trustee of the Green Climate Fund…
-Cancún Agreements97
Current funding directed toward developing countries for climate change and the proposal of the
Copenhagen Accord is insignificant. In addition to Official Development Assistance and public
sources, developed countries must commit to a new annual funding of at least 6% of GDP to
tackle climate change in developing countries. This is viable considering that a similar amount is
spent on national defense… This funding should be direct and free of conditions, and should not
interfere with the national sovereignty or self-determination of the most affected communities and
groups…
A new funding mechanism should be established… functioning under the authority of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and held accountable to it, with significant representation of developing countries, to
ensure compliance with the funding commitments of Annex 1 countries.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba98
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“Cancún” moved the issue of climate financing forward quite a bit. In fact, it was hailed by many
prominent environmentalist groups as its single greatest achievement.99 This was because leaders of the
“developed” countries agreed to mobilize financing of $100 billion USD per year by the year 2020 for
climate change mitigation and adaptation in “developing” countries, and established a Green Climate
Fund to be responsible for administration of these funds. The most likely reason for why the UNFCCC
chose this amount and timeframe was because a significant study conducted by the World Bank in 2010
estimated that this would be the cost of adaptation in developing countries (calculated through estimates
of economic losses).100 Furthermore, they struck an agreement with non-Annex 1 countries to allow the
Green Climate Fund to be housed within the World Bank as long as it is accountable to the UNFCCC
under an independent secretariat comprised equally of representatives from “developed” and
“developing” countries. Given that this fund would not be operational until 2020, the Agreements also
“noted” that “developed” countries agreed to mobilize $30 billion USD over the short-term between
2010-2012. It is important to note that these commitments are merely voluntary pledges, and they will
come from public and private sources, including monies from carbon markets.
Conversely, “Cochabamba” calls for significantly more money to be mobilized to be given to
countries and communities impacted by climate change to assist with adaptation projects, as well as to
pay a “carbon debt” that they believe they are owed for centuries of pollution. Additionally,
“Cochabamba” would dramatically different method for administering the fund. First, instead of the $100
billion USD (roughly .05% of GDP) per year figure from “Cancún,” “Cochabamba” calls for 6% of GDP.
This is twelve times the amount of climate finance mobilized in “Cancún.” The justification given for the
6% of GDP figure is because this is how much the world currently spends on “national defense”
spending. Furthermore, the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba” strongly opposes allowing the World
Bank to take over administration of the Green Climate Fund. Instead, they call for a completely
independent institution that has significant representation from countries most impacted by climate
change. This is further evidence of how “Cochabamba” embodies the critiques of “development”
discussed in Chapter 1. Many of those arguments centered around critiques of the World Bank and other
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neoliberal financial institutions for their role shaping the “development discourse” and for using their
influence to spread neoliberal market reforms. It is also important to note that the “Cochabamba” calls for
this money to come solely from public sources (i.e. commitments from central governments) and rejects
the use of carbon markets or other private sources of funding.
Another significant difference between the two agreements is how to frame the issue of climate
finance. “Cochabamba” purposefully differentiates between “aid” and “climate debt.” In calling for the
latter they are establishing a relationship in which countries most responsible for climate change (Annex
1) owe a “debt” to those who are least responsible for climate change, yet likely to be the most impacted
by it. By refusing to call this money “aid,” which is often seen as given willingly from rich countries to
poor countries and thus with strings often attached to that money, they argue for a climate financial
system that is much larger than the Green Climate Fund proposed “Cancún” (i.e. 6% of global GDP as
opposed to .05% GDP) and that is more in control of non-Annex 1 countries (i.e. not the World Bank).
Additionally, “aid” would be given specifically to finance mitigation and adaptation efforts in “lessdeveloped” countries, while “debt” would be simply given to less-industrialized countries who have not
historically polluted.
The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer
Another significant aspect of climate policy has to do with the transfer of technology related to
climate change mitigation and adaptation from Annex 1 to non-Annex 1 countries:
Decides to establish a Technology Mechanism… which will consist of the following components:
(a) A Technology Executive Committee… [and] (b) A Climate Technology Centre and Network…
Underlines the importance of continued dialogue… in order to make the Technology Mechanism
fully operational in 2012.
-The Cancún Agreements101
It is necessary to… reject the “technology showcase” proposed by developed countries that only
markets technology. It is essential to establish guidelines in order to create a multilateral and
multidisciplinary mechanism for participatory control, management, and evaluation of the
exchange of technologies. These technologies must be useful, clean and socially sound. Likewise,
it is fundamental to establish a fund for the financing and inventory of technologies that are
appropriate and free of intellectual property rights. Patents, in particular, should move from the
hands of private monopolies to the public domain in order to promote accessibility and low costs.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba102

Both “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” have specific policies put in place to facilitate the transfer of “green”
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or “renewable energy” technology developed in industrialized Annex 1 states to be utilized cheaply and
more widespread in non-Annex 1, less-industrialized states. The idea here is that in order for GHG
emissions to remain low, countries without large emissions today will need to be put on the path of
developing energy using low-carbon intensive technologies and generate electricity from more renewable
sources. However, this is costly and to make non-Annex 1 economies do this without providing a
mechanism through which these newer and less-polluting technologies can be transferred would be unfair
and inefficient. “Cancún” is quite vague about technology transfer, and it leaves most of the specific
decision-making about exactly how technology will be transferred from wealthy Annex 1 countries to
non-Annex 1 countries to be decided later. “Cochabamba” is more specific in calling for a technology
transfer mechanism that is equitable and participatory. The main area of disagreement between the two
has to do with intellectual property rights, or IPR. “Cochabamba” explicitly bans IPR, specifically
patents, from being incorporated into the technology transfer mechanism arguing that it establishes
private monopolies that make technologies that are required for climate adaptation or mitigation high in
cost and inaccessible to the communities that need and deserve them the most.
Forest Management Policy
Given the importance of forests (and de-forestation) to the climate change mitigation and
adaptation, both agreements have specific policies regarding forest management and how this will be
incorporated into an international climate regime.
Encourages developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in the forest sector by
undertaking the following activities, as deemed appropriate by each Party and in accordance with
their respective capabilities and national circumstances: (a) Reducing emissions from
deforestation; (b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation; (c) Conservation of forest carbon
stocks; (d) Sustainable management of forest; and (e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
Also requests developing country Parties, when developing and implementing their national
strategies or action plans, to address, inter alia, drivers of deforestation and forest degradation,
land tenure issues, gender considerations… ensuring the full and effective participation of relevant
stakeholders, inter alia, indigenous peoples and local communities.
-Cancún Agreements103
The definition of forests used in the negotiations of the UNFCCC, which includes plantations, is
unacceptable. Monoculture plantations are not forests. Therefore, we require a definition for
negotiation purposes that recognizes that native forests, jungles, and the diverse ecosystems on
Earth.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples must be fully recognized,
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implemented and integrated into climate change negotiations. The best strategy and action to
avoid deforestation and degradation and protect native forests and jungles is to recognize and
guarantee collective rights to lands and territories, especially considering that most of the forests
are located within the territories of indigenous peoples and nations and other traditional
communities.
We condemn market mechanisms such as REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation)… which are violating the sovereignty of peoples and their right to prior free
and informed consent as well as the sovereignty of national States, the customs of Peoples, and the
Rights of Nature.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba104

“Cancún” and “Cochabamba” differ on forest policy in three main areas: 1) how forests are defined, 2)
the “Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” (REDD) mechanism, and 3) the
rights of indigenous peoples and their relationship with forests. First, as stated above, “Cochabamba”
finds the definition that the UNFCCC uses for forests as unacceptable. Specifically, they take issue with
commercial monoculture plantations planted to replace destroyed tropical rainforests in Latin America,
which they do not believe are forests. The reason for this is because the WPCCC participants see them as
industrial tree plantations, and as long as this is defined as a “forest” within the UNFCCC it will create
perverse incentives to cut down native forests and plant tree plantations instead. This process results in a
net increase in carbon emissions because tree plantations store a smaller amount of carbon than native
forests and jungles, which are comprised not only of trees but of entire thriving ecosystems and various
other forms of plant (and animal) life. Also, cutting down native forests and replacing them with tree
plantations entirely ignores the issue of biodiversity loss. Forests are not merely a collection of trees, but
instead support entire ecosystems, and deforestation is therefore seen as not only a driver of climate
change but also the destruction of nature.
The second major issue debated between the two agreements has to do with the market-based
REDD mechanism. This mechanism currently exists in many contexts, including the World Bank, the
United Nations, and within bilateral agreements between states. REDD allows Annex 1 countries to
“offset” their GHG emissions by paying non-Annex 1 countries to protect forests from deforestation
and/or forest degradation. In doing so, this mechanism will transfer ownership and/or use of the forest
being considered from its current legal status (whether commonly-held, public property, or private
property) to become environmentally-protected public property controlled by the state within which it
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resides. Under a mechanism like REDD, nature is “protected” from any human “exploitation” and human
society is severed from interacting with that section of land. Some environmentalist schools of thought
see this as conservation, by allowing nature to have an autonomous existence outside of human society.
Others, however, are critical of this method of conservation because it sees “nature” and “society” as two
different spheres (sometimes referred to as a “nature island”105), rather than seeing how the two are
inherently intertwined with one another (sometimes referred to as a “nature-society hybrid”106). The
question then becomes not if nature should be “exploited” but, how, why, and for what purpose. These
questions have practical implications for who controls this land (if anyone), who has access to it, and how
it interacts with human society, which are all deeply political questions. “Cochabamba” has many
practical critiques of REDD: Many of the REDD projects that have been implemented have not reduced
emissions as much as they have claimed they would. Also, they have been under-funded and
mismanaged in their administration, and they fail to address the underlying drivers of deforestation
(including overconsumption of wood and agricultural products). The WPCCC’s critique of REDD is, in
these instances, similar to the critique of carbon markets: they facilitate overconsumption and capitalist
growth while failing to properly meet their stated goals of climate change mitigation.
The third critique that the WPCCC has to do with the rights of indigenous peoples in relation to
forests and forest management. REDD and other forest protection mechanisms ultimately place exclusive
control of forests into the hands of national state governments that control the territory where they exist,
who in turn deny any social interaction with that land/forest. This process has been controversial as it
relates to indigenous peoples that may already reside within the forests. “Cochabamba” argues that
indigenous peoples have protected forests for centuries, and yet many REDD mechanisms infringe upon
the rights of indigenous groups to live in forests areas and/or maintain their historical or cultural
relationship with them.
“Cancún” was noted as being successful in moving climate negotiations forward in the realm of
forest management. They agreed to maintain the REDD mechanism, but did so by calling for better
administration with respect to addressing the drivers of forest degradation, gender, and the rights of
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indigenous peoples. However, the power for deciding exactly how these better forms of administration
are put into place, or how these rights were to be protected, are placed almost entirely within the purview
of central state governments. “Cancún” calls upon participating governments to put together their own
plans for how to implement REDD and other forest management practices. They also fail to address the
issue of how forests are defined and the distinction between monoculture plantations and native forests.
The Role of Agriculture Policy in Climate Change Policy
In addition to forests and forest management, the issue of agriculture is also a major area of difference
between the “Cancún” and “Cochabamba”:
Note: There is no mention of “agriculture” in the “Cancún Agreements.”
The immense challenge humanity faces of stopping global warming and cooling the planet can
only be achieved through a profound shift in agricultural practices toward the sustainable model of
production used by indigenous and rural farming peoples, as well as other ancestral models and
practices that contribute to solving the problem of agriculture and food sovereignty. This is
understood as the right of peoples to control their own seeds, lands, water, and food production,
thereby guaranteeing, through forms of production that are in harmony with Mother Earth and
appropriate to local cultural contexts, access to sufficient, varied and nutritious foods in
complementarity with Mother Earth and deepening the autonomous (participatory, communal and
shared) production of every nation and people.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba107

As noted above, “Cancún” makes no mention of “agriculture” anywhere. This is significant because,
according to the IPCC, the agriculture sector (through industrial agriculture, methane gas from livestock,
and fossil fuels required to mass-produce agricultural products and transport them internatonally)
accounted for 10-12% of global GHG emissions in 2005.108 By contrast “Cochabamba” places a
significant emphasis on addressing global agricultural practices. Specifically, they critique industrialized
farming as a driver of GHG emissions as well as significantly contributing to food insecurity for various
populations around the world (which will only get worse given climatic change). It also contributes
significantly to further environmental degradation, especially in critical areas like the rainforests of Latin
America where expansion of industrial agriculture has been a driver for massive deforestation. In calling
for a “profound shift in agricultural practices toward the sustainable model of production used by
indigenous and rural farming people” they emphasize the need for “food sovereignty” in which people
have control over their agricultural production processes. Industrial agricultural typically relies heavily
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upon GHG producing technologies and places food production into the hands of multinational
corporations that promote large monocultures.
Agriculture has historically been significantly intertwined with the very fabric of most societies.
Before the dawn of industrial agriculture, peasants and farmers made up a significant proportion of the
global population. Switching to industrial agriculture did result in an unprecedented amount of increased
food production and reduced many forms of hard and intensive labor practices, yet it also had detrimental
effects on the environment and human societies and cultures. It caused significant social dislocation and
migration to large urban centers from rural farming communities causing social upheaval and unrest, and
large populations of “unemployed” workers left to destitution. It also made most countries in the “Global
South” dependent upon imported food, subject to significant price fluctuations. Industrial capitalism
dramatically transformed agriculture throughout the world, increasing GHG emissions and disrupting
social and cultural norms across societies. “Cochabamba” argues that maintaining small and locally
based agricultural systems can serve as an important way of protecting successful existing and/or
historical relationships between human societies and nature. Proponents of “Cochabamba” are deeply
critical of “Cancún” for not even mentioning the word “agriculture” once throughout the entire agreement
and for treating agricultural policy as completely separate from environmental and/or climate policy.
Other Special Legal Considerations for the Climate Regime
Lastly, both agreements have a number of special legal considerations that are noted or incorporated into
their proposed climate regimes:
Emphasizes that Parties should, in all climate change-related actions, fully respect human rights…
Taking note of relevant provisions of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples.
-Cancún Agreements109
To guarantee human rights and to restore harmony with nature, it is necessary to effectively
recognize and apply the rights of Mother Earth. For this purpose, we propose the attached project
for the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth…
Establish an International Tribunal of Conscience to denounce, make visible, document, judge and
punish violations of the rights of migrants, refugees and displaced persons within countries of
origin, transit and destination, clearly identifying the responsibilities of States, companies and
other agents…
Considering the lack of political will on the part of developed countries to effectively comply with
commitments and obligations assumed under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and given the
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lack of legal international organisms to guard against and sanction climate and environmental
crimes that violate the Rights of Mother Earth and humanity, we demand the creation of an
International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal that has the legal capacity to prevent,
judge and penalize States, industries and people that by commission or omission contaminate and
provoke climate change.
-People’s Agreement of Cochabamba110

“Cancún” are again quite vague in this area. They merely call upon parties to the UNFCCC to “fully
respect human rights” in climate mitigation and adaptation, and later “take note” of the UN Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Beyond these statements there are no specific definitions of how
these human rights explicitly relate to climate change policy nor are there any legal mechanisms
established through which these rights can be realized, leaving much open to interpretation and poor
administration. Conversely, “Cochabamba” is specific in terms of detailing new “rights” regimes and
new legal mechanisms through which these rights can be protected. Namely, they call upon the UNFCCC
to 1) pass the “Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth,” 2) establish an International
Tribunal of Conscience, and 3) establish an International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal.
The “Universal Declaration on the Rights of Mother Earth” is perhaps the most significant
contribution put forth by “Cochabamba” and is central to its proposed climate regime. This declaration,
which was formally introduced to the United Nations General Assembly, establishes an “environmental
rights” regime that parallels the international “human rights” regime. This Declaration is notable in that it
is not anthropocentric, but instead establishes rights for “Mother Nature” (i.e. plants, non-human animals,
and ecosystems). It is not only relevant to environmental protection as it relates to climate change but
also intends to make various forms of environmental degradation (including the emission of GHGs) a
violation of international law.
“Cochabamba” also calls for the “International Tribunal of Conscience” which would specifically
address the human rights of migrants, refugees, and internally-displaced persons as a result of climate
change. Given the dramatic impacts that climate change are projected to have over the coming century,
many researchers have began looking at the intersection of climate change and migration. In fact, a
landmark study by Oxford University academic Norman Myers estimates there could be as many as 200
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million people displaced by the year 2050 as a result of climate change111 To put this in perspective, the
UN recently estimated in 2000 that roughly 3% of the world’s population (180 million people) was
classified as an “international migrant,” and in 2006 the UNHCR estimated that there were around 9.9
million refugees around the world. If this estimate turns out to be accurate, that would mean that the
number of migrants and refugees would more than double over the next 40 years as a result of climate
change. As many legal scholars have pointed out, the current definition of “refugee” is inadequate as it
relates to populations subjected to migration due to climate change because it refers solely to someone
who crosses international borders and cannot return to their country of origin for fear of political
oppression. Under this definition, most of the people forced to migrate as a result of climate change
(whether they be migrants, “refugees,” or internally-displaced persons) would not be entitled to the legal
protections that are currently given to “refugees.” In order to address this issue “Cochabamba’s” call for
an “International Tribunal of Conscience” would provide international legal protections to all humans
forced to migrate as a result of climate change.
Lastly, the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba” calls upon the UN to establish an
“International Climate and Environmental Justice Tribunal” and for this to be the ultimate authority for
enforcing a climate regime overseeing environmental and human rights protections as it relates to climate
change and other forms of environmental degradation. In contrast to the reliance of “Cancún” on carbon
markets and voluntary participation in a climate regime, the “International Climate and Environmental
Justice Tribunal” would have legally-binding authority to oversee and enforce the international climate
regime, and bring forth any central state government who violates their responsibilities under the climate
treaty. Exactly how this Tribunal would be enforcing the climate regime, especially against any powerful,
polluting state government, is unclear. Without major political and economic reforms in the entire UN
framework, this Tribunal may be insignificant.
Logical Basis
As the previous section demonstrates, “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” differ dramatically in their
approach to climate policy in regards to mitigation, adaptation and climate regime administration.
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“Cancún” are largely designed to sustain neoliberal, industrial capitalism, mostly through the voluntary
use of commodified carbon pollution and international trade of carbon credits and carbon offsets, and
“Cochabamba” is designed to challenge capitalism by significantly reducing the ability of nation states to
continue industrial development while putting in place various legal mechanisms for human and
environmental rights to be protected. Clearly, the logics underpinning each of the two agreements are
remarkably different, with “Cancún” largely reflecting what is known as market environmentalism and
“Cochabamba” largely reflects rights-based environmentalism. This section will conclude the policy
analysis of “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” by explaining these logics in greater detail.
Market Environmentalism
As discussed above, “Cancún” is largely seen as the basis for a future climate regime that would
utilize market mechanisms to regulate GHG emissions and provide financing for adaptation efforts. The
underlying logic behind this perspective lies in what is largely referred to as “market environmentalism”
in which market mechanisms are manipulated or regulated in order to provide environmental protection.
The core of this logic has to do with a “cost-benefit” analysis through the lens of market economics,
assessing the economic damage that climate change would inflict, and then prescribing market-based
solutions (such as commodified carbon pollution traded on international carbon markets together with
mechanisms for carbon offsets) to compensate or prevent economic losses. There is probably no better
articulation of this logic as it relates to climate change than the landmark Stern Review published in 2006
(named after the UK market economist Sir Nicholas Stern).
The Stern Review is a comprehensive 700-page report commissioned by the British government
that seeks to explain the “economics of climate change” as it relates to the projected impact on the global
economy and thus prescribe economic solutions to the crisis.112 The report was heralded as a huge success
by many climate change policy advocates, including former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore and economist
Joseph Stiglitz, because it offers an economic rationale for addressing climate change as soon as possible.
Utilizing a monetized cost-benefit analysis, the report argues that the cost that anthropogenic climate
change will have on society will be immense if left unmitigated; however, if mitigation and adaptation
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efforts are pursued soon the economic damages can be minimized or avoided. It proposes a neoclassicalframework for understanding climate change in which economists can project how much environmental
damage will result because of climate change. Then, a similar analysis can be conducted examining what
the economic cost of mitigation and adaptation efforts would be. The Stern Review argues that the
economic cost of inaction is actually greater than the economic cost of mitigation and adaptation efforts,
therefore economically justifying the creation of an international climate regime. Under this approach,
GHG emissions are seen as an “externality” that are not figured into market exchanges as a cost of
production, thus representing a market failure. The creation of a carbon tax or a global carbon market
could address this externality by incorporating the cost of anthropogenic climate change into market
transactions by imposing a cost on GHG emissions as part of the cost of production.
The Stern Review calculates economic losses using three approaches: 1) estimating the physical
impacts on economic activity, on human life and on the environment, 2) comparing macro-economic
losses measured in global GDP based on various climate models scenarios, and 3) comparing the
marginal costs of mitigation/adaptation with the social cost of carbon emissions. This analysis estimates
that the economic losses that would result from unmitigated anthropogenic climate change would be a
loss in global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by at least 5% each year, now and forever, and in some
scenarios this could be as high as 20%.113 The report also recognizes that most of these economic losses
will occur in the poorest countries because they are most susceptible to climate change and have the
fewest resources to plan for and adapt to them. It also estimates that the cost of intervening to stabilize
CO2 emissions at around 500-550ppm would be roughly 1% of global GDP each year.114 Stern later
increased this estimate to 2% of global GDP to account for recent climate data that demonstrated climate
change accelerating beyond originally projected estimates.115 Here, through the lens of a “cost-benefit
analysis,” Stern demonstrates that economic losses (mostly measured in reduced global GDP) are greater
than the costs of mitigation/adaptation to address the market failure presented by GHG emissions.
The Stern Review was criticized by many market economists, but most of their criticisms fell
within the discipline of market economics (William Nordhaus took issue with the discount-rate for
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projecting future damage caused by climate change, Robert Mendelsohn objected to the fact that it only
compared one policy to no policy at all, rather than evaluating various market-approaches, and Jeffrey
Sachs questioned method for calculating economic losses).116
What is perhaps most interesting about the Stern Review is that this is precisely the impact that
market logic has had on policy making in modern public policy. As discussed in the previous Chapter,
public policy debates taking place today are almost entirely within the neoliberal “development
discourse” which has become the dominant lens through which all policy-makers now view policy. In
order to understand a social problem it must first be given a monetary cost (in this case, the economic cost
of anthropogenic climate change on society) and then solutions to the problem must demonstrate that
public policy will provide an adequate benefit for the cost of regulation or intervention in the market. For
this reason, the “Cancún Agreements” are largely focused on capping GHG emissions at a level that fits
within their “cost-benefit” analysis, and it seeks to do so through the use of voluntary market-based
mechanisms such as commodifying GHGs, utilizing “carbon offsets,” and establishing a carbon market.
There have been a number of critiques of market environmentalism from outside the
“development discourse.” One is that only assessing the damage caused by climate change through
economic valuation (GDP) favors damage caused to wealthier countries, and minimizes (or ignores
outright) damage caused to poorer populations, despite the number of people who live there, or the size of
the environmental degradation. GDP is distributed remarkably unequally around the world, thus resulting
in major economic, moral, and political issues with using GDP as the sole metric for climate policy. It is
also problematic because “green capitalism” (or “green accumulation”) is paradoxical because it is
designed to sustain the very system that causes the problem. Philip McMichael criticizes the market
environmentalist approach because it “leads to the commodification of the ecological commons through
green market solutions such as carbon trading, emissions offsets and biofuels, to sustain, rather than
question, current trajectories of accumulation and consumption.”117 McMichael argues that deploying the
market approach to solving climate change would sustain a system of endless consumption that is
inherently ecologically unsustainable. Thus, he asserts that this so-called “green-accumulation” is really
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an oxymoron because perpetual accumulation (infinite growth) given a finite physical world is inherently
unsustainable. Additionally, McMichael critiques the concept of “market environmentalism” as a selflegitimizing project: market logic is used to comprehend an environmental issue (through monetization,
which allows quantification through pricing and/or commodification). Once monetized, a market
mechanism is deployed to remedy what is perceived to be the problem. But this process, while effective
in its own mode of purely quantitative calculation, actually divorces natural processes from human
processes and further damages the environment; thus further legitimizing the utilization of “market
environmentalism” to understand and fix that problem. This becomes a self-reinforcing cycle that misses
the major solution to most environmental problems, including climate change: putting an end to limitless
accumulation of capital and endlessly expanding commodification.
Lastly, the market environmentalist approach is problematic because it is largely focused on
privatizing nature and altering property relationships. Property can be private, public, or commonly held
depending on how who has control and access to the land. Each of these relationships will dramatically
alter society-nature relationships, and oftentimes privatization does so in a way that exacerbates
inequality.118 One clear example here for how this directly relates to climate policy can be in the
controversy over the Reducing Emissions through Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD)
mechanism supported by “Cancún.” “Cochabamba” opposes this mechanism because it provides a way
for polluters to continue polluting while pushing responsibility for reducing emissions to countries where
it would be “cheaper” to do so. This process hands over property rights for large sections of forests
(especially rainforests in Latin America) to local state governments or other private entities. This
potentially displaces poorer, mostly indigenous peoples, from their traditional relationship with their land
and forests, dispossessing them of control/access to land that they once required for their livelihoods in
the interest of commodification and/or capital accumulation (Harvey referred to this process of
dispossession as the loss of rights as “accumulation by dispossession”).119 Market environmentalism is an
inadequate and problematic method for addressing environmental policy because it relies on privatization,
which alters property relations without any concern for notions of equality.
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Rights-Based Environmentalism
The above critiques are shared in the “Cochabamba.” It begins by directly criticizing market
mechanisms and historical capitalist development as the root cause of anthropogenic climate change and
from this critique of neoliberal development they instead argue for a rights-based logic to address the
climate crisis. By rejecting the idea that human society has dominion over nature, a balance is sought
between human society and the larger environment. Thus, the logic of the People’s Agreement becomes a
balance between human rights and environmental rights.
This perspective is promoted not only by “Cochabamba” but is also the guiding logic behind most
environmental justice activists, such as the NGO Friends of the Earth International - the world’s largest
grassroots environmental network with over one million members in 68 national organizations on every
continent. They argue that human rights and environmental rights have been developing normatively and
formally since 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment, and serious progress has been made
to further their development within the international legal system.120 Specifically, they report that:
In 1994, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment for the Sub-Commission
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities released a groundbreaking,
detailed analysis of the relationship between human rights and the environment, concluding that
environmental damage has an adverse affect on the enjoyment of a series of human rights, and that
human rights violations in turn damage the environment. In the meantime, a series of UN
resolutions, court decisions and international bodies have further shaped and endorsed this general
statement. To date, however, there is little binding legislation referring to environmental human
rights.

Countless other NGOs, climate justice activists, groups of indigenous people and all of the other
signatories of the “Cochabamba” are in support of this perspective. They all believe that having human
rights and environmental rights as the basis for a future legally-binding climate regime is the only way to
ensure a just solution to the climate crisis.
Vandana Shiva, a supporter of environmental rights and outspoken advocate of the “People’s
Agreement of Cochabamba” argues that the entire notion of “sustainable development” offered by the
neoliberal approach is inadequate. She directly challenges the Stern Review as being limited to “within
the global market and commodification paradigm.”121 She frames the climate debate as one of “Eco-
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Imperialism vs. Earth Democracy” and sees market-driven climate policies as damaging to truly
sustainable development. She writes that “to achieve genuine sustainability, energy systems need to be
embedded in society and ecosystems. They can only be considered sustainable socially if they do not
enclose and usurp the ecological space of the poor and lead to energy equity. They can only be
considered sustainable ecologically if they facilitate the shift to decentralized, low-impact economies and
do not introduce risks of atmospheric or nuclear pollution.”122 Here, Shiva is challenging the industrial
conception of “sustainable development” which commodifies nature as an input into a larger production
process because it leads to widespread social and ecological dislocation. Instead, she offers a solution to
climate change rooted in traditional agricultural practices that restore local cultural practices in areas
where farmers and peasants have been socially, economically, and politically dislocated, and all with
dramatically fewer GHG emissions.
Chapter 2 Conclusion
This Chapter has demonstrated that the “Cancún” and “Cochabamba” represent remarkably
different approaches to climate policy. “Cancún” embodies a market environmentalist approach seeking
to commodify pollution and establish voluntary global carbon markets to address climate change, in effect
utilizing neoliberal mechanisms to sustain industrial capitalism. Alternatively, the “Cochabamba”
embodies many of the critiques of development and sustainable development by directly challenging the
market environmentalist approach and advocating for a climate regime that would be centered on
reducing industrial production by pushing a regime designed to protect human and environmental rights.
This would severely reduce GHG emissions and mobilize a much greater redistribution of wealth from
polluting states, with special considerations put in place to protect the environment and various vulnerable
groups such as indigenous peoples, climate migrants, and the global poor.
It is significant to note that the state of Bolivia’s endorsement of this perspective is quite
remarkable in the history of the politics of development. When Bolivia formally introduced the
“Cochabamba” for consideration at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) it marked the first time in history when a state government formally endorsed this perspective

59

in international treaty negotiations. The next Chapter will focus on how this played out on the
international stage, and how the political and economic powers that built, promoted, and now benefit from
the neoliberal model of capitalist development quickly silenced the Bolivian proposals. Doing so will
further demonstrate that the “development discourse” that Arturo Escobar talks about, and how political
and economic powers that dominate the international scene today have disciplined the climate debate.
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Chapter 3: How Political and Economic Power Shapes the Climate Policy Debate
The state of Bolivia was the only government in the world to reject “Cancún,” and despite the
need for unanimous consent the UNFCCC procedurally routed the Bolivian government and formally
adopted it.G They were essentially the same set of policies that had been widely rejected just one year
earlier in Copenhagen. What changed? Why had the stricter, rights-based approaches of the
“Cochabamba” been shelved so quickly, and why did the rest of the world begin pursuing the voluntary,
market-based climate regime they once soundly rejected and adopt “Cancún” instead? In the chapter that
follows I will seek to answer this question by closely examining how political power and economic
interests shape and discipline the climate policy debate. This analysis will focus on three main sectors of
political and economic power and interests, including: 1) state politics, 2) political economy of the energy
industry, and 3) global civil society. As I demonstrated in Chapter 2, “Cancún” was designed to sustain
industrial capitalism in the face of anthropogenic climate change while the “Cochabamba” challenges that
model of economic development as the cause of, not the solution to, climate change. In this Chapter, I
will demonstrate that the political and economic forces that have perpetuated the neoliberal model of
economic development over the past few decades are the same forces that have disciplined the climate
policy community into adopting the model proposed by “Cancún” while quickly dismissing the
alternative approaches embodied in the “Cochabamba.” These complex political and economic processes
are often driven by the ideological disposition towards support for neoliberal policies, but largely
comprised of private industry’s pursuit of economic profit, or political co-optation and coercion of forces
opposed to the neoliberal project.
State Politics and Climate Policy
The UNFCCC is made up of representatives from all UN-recognized state governments around
the world. Thus, one must first understand the political dynamics of the climate policy debate in light of
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Bolivia continued to object to passage of “Cancún”, and the proceedings continued late into the night. Eventually,
Mexico, who was hosting the conference and responsible for overseeing proceedings, moved forward with passing
the “Cancún Agreements” with “unanimous consent” by merely noting that objections from Bolivia would be
submitted formally at a later time.
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state politics. Piet Buys and colleagues propose a useful method for analyzing state politics in light of the
climate policy debate. They argue that state governments formulate their positions on climate policy in
these negotiations through an analysis of two forms of vulnerability: 1) Source Vulnerability – a country’s
vulnerability to mandated GHG emissions reductions, and 2) Impact Vulnerability – the direct impact of
climate change on countries.123 This two-pronged analysis provides insight into the rationale for why
governments take their respective approaches to climate policy in these negotiations: if a country
perceives that it has a high Source Vulnerability (i.e. they would be economically disadvantaged by
increasing the cost of, or mandated reduction in, GHG emissions) but has low Impact Vulnerability (i.e.
the impact of climate change on their country is perceived as not that big of a threat), they are likely to
reject any strict climate regime mandating GHG emissions reductions. However, if the ruling government
of a country has low perceived Source Vulnerability (i.e. would not be greatly economically
disadvantaged by a mandated reduction in GHG emissions) but has high Impact Vulnerability (i.e. the
impact of climate change on their country is perceived as a significant threat) then they will likely be
more inclined to push for a strict climate regime. Below I will use this analysis to discuss the complex
motivations of two important political dynamics in state politics: the relationship between China, the EU,
and the US, and the relationship between wealthy countries and resource poor countries.
China, the EU and the US
The analysis mentioned above by Piet Buys and colleagues looked more closely at specific
countries and their Source and Impact vulnerabilities as perceived by policy makers in each state. When
looking at Source vulnerabilities they examined available fossil fuel resources, renewable energy
potential, and carbon sequestration strategies (such as REDD carbon offsets, or underground sequestration
potential). When looking at Impact vulnerabilities they examined agricultural impacts, sea level rise, and
natural climatic hazard risks. This analysis reveals that of the 20 largest GHG emitting states, 12 of them
have a “low” stake in advancing a strict climate regime, 6 have a “medium” stake, and only 2 have a
“high” stake (Mexico and the Philippians). Most discouraging is the that those with a “low” stake a
creating a climate regime were some of the largest emitters such as China, India, the US, and many of the
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large economies within the EU (such as the UK and Germany).124 These, coincidentally, are the same
proponents of “Cancún.” Alternatively, Bolivia is seen as having “low” Source vulnerability and “high”
Impact vulnerability, thus inclining them to have a “high” stake in a strict climate regime.125
In looking solely at these data it becomes a bit more clear why each government advocates for
their respective position: the governments of industrialized countries that are dependent upon fossil fuels
and believe they have a low vulnerability to the impact of climate change would advocate for a weaker,
voluntary climate regime similar to the one put forth in the “Cancún.” Alternatively, the governments of
less-industrialized countries that are less-dependent upon fossil fuels with a perceived vulnerability to the
impacts of climate change are more likely to advocate for a stricter climate regime, perhaps one similar to
“Cochabamba.” Of course, this analysis is somewhat simplistic and ignores other geopolitical factors that
ought to be taken into account (such as energy and environmental politics, or the role of civil society).
First, one can look at the EU as perhaps the strongest advocate of climate policy, and they have
arguably been the nations who have put in place the strongest climate regime policies, and have together
negotiated within the UNFCCC for a stricter climate regime in comparison to other industrialized nations.
Given the analysis of Buys and colleagues, this would not make sense, given that they are not the
countries in the world with the “highest” stake in negotiating for strict climate policy based off of their
analysis. However, data suggest that they are among the most progressive in this field. A study
conducted at Yale and Columbia Universities looked at a wide array of climate-related indices and
determined that the five countries in the world that have the strongest climate regimes are in fact Sweden,
Norway, Finland, Switzerland, and the non-European middle-income country of Costa Rica.126 Anthony
Giddens looked further into what these countries, and others who have been somewhat successful in
advancing national and/or European climate policy (such as the UK and Germany), to see what
characteristics these governments had in common.127 First, all five of these countries are democracies, in
stark contrast to other totalitarian or authoritarian regimes who tend to advance technology and
investments in their military rather than the environmental sphere. Second, with a few exceptions, most
countries with stronger climate protections advance these policies more out of a desire for energy
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independence and the economic benefits of energy efficiency rather than concern for climate change. The
fact that climate-related policies often reinforce or complement these other state policies has helped move
them forward. Third, these countries have also seen their GHG-intensive industries (such as
manufacturing) decline nationally and move production to other “developing” countries, such as China or
India. Thus, the levels of GHG emissions in these countries would likely be higher if more goods were
produced nationally, and the process of moving production elsewhere has contributed significantly to
increased emissions elsewhere.
However, this is not to say that EU governments advocate for as strict a climate regime as the one
found in the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba.” Instead, they formally support a regime similar to
the Kyoto Protocol, but with calls for increased participation from other industrialized countries (namely
the US and China) and with slightly stricter emissions reductions targets. The EU has formally called for
industrialized countries to reduce their emissions from 1990 to 2020 by 30%, and pledged to reduce their
own emissions by 20% in this time with another pledge to increase this to 30% if other industrialized
nations reduce their own. The EU has chosen to do this through the utilization of a market-based
approach and has established the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2007. Unfortunately,
this was a relatively weak carbon market that included numerous giveaways and exemptions to the
biggest polluters and has so far failed to significantly reduce emissions. Thus, Anthony Giddens has
summarized the EU’s climate policy as “too much talk, too little action”.128
Thus, the EU governments remain a proponent of a stronger climate regime than currently exists
within the Kyoto Protocol; however they do not go as far as the Bolivians and instead merely advocate for
market-based approaches, albeit with mandatory participation. This sets them apart from the United
States government, which has refused to sign onto the Kyoto Protocol. The US is arguably the main force
behind the “Copenhagen Accord” and “Cancún.” Additionally, the US Special Envoy for Climate Change
Todd Stern argued that “Cancún” was “fundamentally consistent with US objectives” in climate
negotiations.129 But what are the US objectives in climate negotiations? Bill Clinton, US president during
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, was originally reluctant to agree to any mandatory emissions reductions,
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however he did come around to this and supported the Kyoto Protocol. Unfortunately, the US Congress
voted unanimously against any agreement that did not mandate emissions reductions for other countries
as well, which the Kyoto Protocol did not. Later, US president George W. Bush, already a climate
skeptic with close ties to the fossil fuel industry, argued that China might gain competitive advantage over
the US.130 Aside from international geopolitical concerns, the US also has significant domestic
opposition to a strict climate regime. Most popular among them is the fossil fuel industry, which has
strong influence in the US political system. Left-leaning organizations, such as organized labor within the
US, have also historically been opposed to a strict climate regime for fears that it would exacerbate the
US unemployment issues. Both of these issues will be further unpacked later in this paper.
For the reasons discussed above, much of the world has begun to regard the US as the primary
obstacle to achieving a mandatory post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime. However, the US is no longer the
world’s largest emitter of GHGs. It is second to China, and many climate negotiators thus believe that the
US-China relationship in climate negotiations will ultimately drive international climate policy. And so
far, it largely has – “Cancun” was originally developed between the US and China. Obviously, the nondemocratic Chinese government does not have the same pressures from civil society as the US and EU
governments do. But they are not ignorant to the fact that climate change will have a profoundly negative
impact on many Chinese people, and this has been accepted by Chinese government officials.
Specifically, millions of Chinese people depend on China’s river network for survival, but melting
glaciers that are the source of these rivers are expected to become a major problem in the near future.
This would also negatively impact the Chinese energy sector, which is highly dependent upon
hydroelectricity.131 Despite these acknowledgements, Chinese President Hu Jintau recently said that
China would not accept any mandatory emissions reductions of any kind because Chinese per capita
emissions are relatively low, and they have historically not emitted as much as other Western
industrialized countries that were able to develop their industrial economies freely emitting GHGs. He
also argued that “China’s central task now is to develop the economy and make life better for the people,”
and mandatory emissions reductions would hinder their ability to do so.132 For this reason, the Chinese
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government has put forth their own Climate Change Plan in 2006 which does agree to move in the right
direction, albeit not nearly far enough to meet GHG emissions reductions recommended by the IPCC.
For example, it pledges to produce 16% of Chinese electricity from renewable sources by 2020, but
doesn’t anticipate a peak in GHG emissions anytime soon.133
Therefore, in merely looking at China, the EU, and the US, one can see that the political priorities
of the political classes and national policy makers in each country are not advancing any kind of strict
climate regime similar one advocated for by the “Cochabamba.” Instead, there is agreement on the need
to act to do something about climate change and there is support for market-based policies; however only
the EU right now will commit to mandatory reductions. Thus, the best deal that can be struck between
them is, in effect, “Cancún.”
“Wealthy Countries” v. “Resource Poor Countries”
A point that has been emphasized in this paper repeatedly is that while most of the GHG
emissions that have caused anthropogenic climate change have come from industrialized countries, the
bulk of the negative impacts from climate change will be felt by the poorest, least-industrialized
countries. This simple example of dramatic inequality should compel policy makers to do something to
provide the massive level of assistance that resource poor countries require. However, there are lessaltruistic reasons that wealthy countries like the US should be concerned about the negative impacts of
climate change on resource poor countries, and chief among them tends to be stability and security
concerns.134 Regardless, a simple analysis of the vulnerabilities that resource poor countries have to
impacts of climatic change would lead many of them to take a stake in climate negotiations that would
require mandatory emissions reductions and significant assistance to poorer nations, and also include
various human rights protections. For this reason, one would think that many of the poorest countries
would advocate for a policy proposal along the lines of the “Cochabamba.” On the climate finance issue
alone, the amount of financial assistance to poor countries called for in the “Cochabamba” (6% of global
GDP by 2020) is remarkably higher than what is called for in “Cancún” (.5% of global GDP by 2020).
Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 2, many national governments of resource poor countries are
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increasingly skeptical and critical of allowing transnational institutions controlled by wealthy countries to
be responsible for administering the climate regime, which is why there was significant resistance to
allowing the World Bank administer the Green Climate Fund (GCF), even though some safeguards were
put in place to make it more transparent and accountable to resource poor countries vulnerable to climate
change. Given these inclinations, why is Bolivia the only country to reject “Cancún,” while every other
country that originally rejected it signed on just one year later?
There are a few explanations to this question. The most commonly held position was that
negotiators for developing countries realized after Copenhagen that they were somewhat powerless in
pushing for a stricter climate regime when ultimately any deal that does not have participation from the
world’s largest polluters (most notably the US and China) will be futile. Therefore, they felt compelled to
sign on to anything that could potentially move in the direction of any post-Kyoto climate regime.
However, there is also evidence that demonstrates that many poor countries were co-opted and/or coerced
(namely by the US and EU governments) into accepting “Cancún.”
Many of recently leaked diplomatic cables from the whistleblower website “Wikileaks”
demonstrate how the US and EU governments co-opted and/or coerced opponents of the “Copenhagen
Accord.” One cable from US Deputy National Security Advisor Michael Froman described US
frustrations with the BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) countries’ negotiating. He writes:
It is remarkable how closely co-ordinated the Basic group has become in international fora, taking
turns to impede US/EU initiatives and playing the US and EU off against each other. Basic
countries have widely differing interests, but have subordinated these to their common short-term
goals. The US and EU need to learn from this co-ordination and work much more closely and
effectively together ourselves, to better handle third country obstructionism and avoid future train
wrecks on climate, Doha or financial regulatory reform.135

This cable clearly demonstrates that the US recognizes it must take a strong negotiating stance in
collaboration with the EU, and diplomatically pressure many key players within the UNFCCC into
accepting their position.
Another cable specifically mentions how the US planned to engage one of the biggest and most
reluctant climate skeptics, Saudi Arabia. In a cable with the subject line “Two faces of Saudi Arabia’s

67

climate negotiating position” the US Ambassador James Smith says:
Saudi officials have suggested that they need to find a way to climb down gracefully from the
country’s tough negotiating position. More sustained engagement in co-ordination with other
governments, particularly if pitched as an effort to develop partnership, may help them do so…
Saudi officials are very eager to obtain investment credits for carbon capture and storage (CCS)
and other technology transfer projects.136

This cable demonstrates that the Obama Administration believes that some countries, in this case Saudi
Arabia, can be co-opted into accepting a deal if certain investments/aid can be promised.
Two other cables demonstrate a similar admission of US manipulation of climate-related aid to
gain support. In a cable dated just two weeks after the “Copenhagen Accord” was put forth in December
2009, the Maldives’ Ambassador to the US, Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed wrote to US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton expressing eagerness to back the deal. This is remarkable because, as a small island
nation whose existence is greatly threatened by potential sea level rise, the Maldives has historically been
a strong and vocal advocate for a very strict climate regime. However, in another cable Ghafoor told US
Deputy Climate Change Envoy, Jonathan Pershing, that the Maldives wanted “tangible assistance” and
argued that other reluctant countries would then realize “the advantages to be gained by compliance with
the accord.” Cables then went back and forth and Pershing encouraged Ghafoor to “provide concrete
examples and costs in order to increase the likelihood of bilateral assistance.”137 He did so and detailed
specific climate-related projects totaling $50 million. Following this exchange, Connie Hedegaard, the
EU Climate Action Commissioner, told Pershing “the Aosis [Alliance of Small Island States] countries
could be our best allies given their need for financing.”138 Here, the EU and US climate negotiators
clearly realize that manipulation of and/or promises of climate-related aid could result in increase support
from resource poor countries.
Another cable reveals a similar interaction between the US and the African Union (AU). The
cable summarizes a meeting between US Undersecretary of State Maria Otero and Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles Zenawi, who also leads the AU’s climate negotiations. In the cable, “Otero urged Meles
to sign the Copenhagen accord on climate change and explained that it is a point of departure for further
discussion and movement toward the topic.” In essence, she refused to continue foreign aid related
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discussions until he agreed to support the Copenhagen Accord. He then did so, but voiced concern that
the US would not follow through on its pledges of climate aid.139 Again, these demonstrate that the US
sees resource poor countries as vulnerable to climate change and in desperate need for aid. This can be
used as a way to co-opt them into signing on to a climate deal that may not be as strong as they would
require or demand.
One last cable demonstrates outright coercion on behalf of the US and EU climate negotiators,
specifically towards the more reluctant Latin American countries, including Bolivia. In a cable between
EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard and US Deputy National Security Advisor Michael
Froman, Hedegaard reassured the US of their support despite the fact that they publically condemned the
accord for not going far enough. According to Hedegaard, this was merely political positioning, and she
claimed that the US and EU needed to work together to “neutralize, co-opt or marginalize unhelpful
countries including Venezuela and Bolivia.” She then went on to note “the irony that the EU is a big
donor to these countries.”140 This threat was followed up months later in April 2010 when the US cut off
millions of US dollars in aid to Bolivia and Ecuador, citing their opposition to the Copenhagen Accord.
These leaked diplomatic cables and the ensuing manipulation of climate-related aid reveal that
there was a coordinated effort on behalf of the US and EU governments to co-opt and/or coerce resource
poor countries and others who are reluctant to sign onto a weak climate regime. It is therefore no mystery
why Bolivia remained the only country in the world to oppose “Cancún,” and for doing so it lost a
significant amount of US foreign aid. This strategy of co-optation and coercion by wealthy Western
governments in order to further neoliberal global governance is similar to many of the tactics utilized by
the same governments, sometimes through institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, to spread
neoliberal policies in the past.141
The Political Economy of the Energy Industry and Climate Policy
The issue of anthropogenic climate change is intrinsically interwoven with energy policy. The
emission of GHGs that has caused climate change has come from the extraction and burning of fossil
fuels, and the dominance that this energy form has over the global economy is apparent. As noted above,
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Anthony Giddens’ analysis of the countries with the strictest climate policies reveals that concerns about
energy security tends to trump concerns about climate change in terms of national political priorities of
Western governments.142 There is a whole host of geo-political reasons for why countries would want to
abandon fossil fuels aside from concerns for climate change, such as energy security and independence,
the volatile price of oil, political and military conflict with, between and among oil-producing states, etc.
And the alternative and renewable energy sectors have grown significantly in recent decades and continue
to play an important role in shaping both international energy policy as well as climate policy. I will not
delve into the complexities of these political realities and their role in geopolitics here, but rather focus on
the role that energy industries have played in shaping climate policy given the significant, widespread
influence they have in influencing government representatives responsible for framing and implementing
these climate policies.
Fossil Fuel Industry
The fossil fuel industry is often blamed for being one of the biggest political obstacles to
advancing climate policy around the world (specifically in the US), and in many ways this is arguably
true. Any effort to make mandatory reductions in GHG emissions will ultimately lead to reduced
production and consumption of fossil fuels, and thus lead to reductions in revenues and profits for the
industry as a whole. For this reason, the fossil fuel industry is blamed for obstructing climate policy in
two major ways: 1) actively lobbying and influencing electoral politics (especially in the US) against
advancing climate policy nationally and internationally and 2) muddling the scientific debate around
climate science to manipulate public opinion. And the fact that the fossil fuel industry is among the most
profitable industries on the planet ensures that they have considerable capital and resources at their
disposal to accomplish both of these goals.
First, the fossil fuel industry is among the largest industries that lobby and influence electoral
politics in the US. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 2008 the oil and gas industry was
the 9th largest contributing industry to US Federal elections, giving over $6.2 million to candidates, 86%
of whom where Republicans opposed to any climate policy.143 Just one year later, when the Congress that
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was put into power by that election voted on a very modest domestic market-based climate bill (the
American Clean Energy and Security Act, or “ACES Act”), it barely passed the US House of
Representatives and only gained support of 8 of the 179 Republicans there. Soon after, the bill failed to
become law because it was never voted on in the US Senate due to a Republican filibuster. This is but
one example of the influence that the fossil fuel industry has had on domestic climate policy in the US.
Given the influence that it has over domestic politics within the US it is clear why the US never signed
onto the Kyoto Protocol and has been reluctant to accept any mandatory emissions reductions.
The direct influence of the fossil fuel industry on US electoral politics is just one way in which
they have influenced climate policy. The second, and perhaps more impactful, method for obstructing
climate policy has come through the funding of public relations campaigns and opposition research to
obstruct the complexities of climate science, especially among the US public. The book “Merchants of
Doubt” by science historians Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway describes in detail how various industries
fund research to obscure data and confuse the public on important complex scientific issues, from tobacco
use to acid rain to ozone depletion to climate change science. Specifically, they note how the fossil fuel
industry is responsible for funding scientists specifically for the purpose of obscuring climate science and
confusing the public into thinking that there is still considerable scientific uncertainty about whether or
not human activity is responsible for climate change, or if the climate is in fact really changing.144 At
every step in the process (funding of climate-related science, publishing scientific data, communicating
scientific findings to the public, etc.) the fossil fuel industry has obscured the debate and influenced
public opinion, and this has been largely successful in reducing support for climate policy within the US.
Perhaps the most damaging public relations fiasco for climate science came just before the
UNFCCC summit in Copenhagen in December 2009, which became known as “Climategate.” The
supposed scandal involved the release of hacked e-mail correspondences between top climate scientists
discussing how to communicate their scientific findings to the public. Many climate skeptic groups
seized on these correspondences as “evidence” that climate scientists were coordinating a conspiracy and
manipulating their data to mislead the public. The news media quickly picked up on this story and it

71

became the topic of discussion in many news reports covering the climate negotiations taking place in
Copenhagen. The impact that “Climategate” had on US public opinion was palpable, especially just prior
to what was considered the most important climate summit in history. A Yale and George Mason
University poll found that in November 2008, 71% of Americans agreed that the earth’s climate was
warming. Just five weeks after “Climategate” broke, that number had dropped to 57%. These researchers
concluded that “Climategate had a significant negative effect on public beliefs in global warming and
trust in scientists.” 145 And a separate poll conducted by the polling firm Gallup found that in 2010,
following “Climategate,” 46% of Americans believed that the threat of climate change was “greatly
exaggerated,” up from just 30% in 2007.146
One of the leading scientists at the center of the controversy was climatologist Michael Mann. He
commented on the supposed scandal by saying, “Climate science has basically been at the receiving end
of the best-funded, best-organized smear campaign by the wealthiest industry that the Earth has ever
known—that's the bottom line.” 147 And that industry is the fossil fuel industry, which has stood against
climate policies not only in the US but also around the world, fighting with policy makers and climate
scientists and the public to delay, weaken, or destroy any form of climate policy from becoming law.
Until this point I have talked about the “fossil fuel industry” as a singular, homogenous entity.
However, this does not accurately reflect the complexities and differences among companies within the
fossil fuel industry. A significant amount of research has been conducted on the various positions that oil
companies have taken with regards to climate policy, and not all of them are openly hostile or opposed to
climate policy that calls for mandatory reductions in GHG emissions. Sybille van den Hove and
colleagues published a study in 2002 looking at the climate change strategy of three different oil
companies: ExxonMobil, TotalFinalElf, and BP Amoco, and generally broke them up into three
categories: “fight against emissions constraints,” “wait and see,” and “proactive” strategies,
respectively.148 The first company, ExxonMobil, places their focus on maximizing business profits while
publically downplaying any connection between anthropogenic climate change and GHG emissions.
TotalFinalElf, alternatively, simply avoids responsibility for climate change by focusing on maintaining
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business as usual without actively engaging in any public campaigns or actively putting in place any
business strategy having to deal with climate change. The last example of BP Amoco was an example of
a large oil company that publicly recognizes the legitimacy of anthropogenic climate change and is
actively involved in modifying their business practices to address it, however they will only do so as far
as this is profitable. BP, formerly “Beyond Petroleum,” has rebranded itself to be “Beyond Petroleum”
and has engaged in a public branding campaign to pitch itself as the energy company of the future,
making significant investments in alternative energy technology, and has publicly lobbied in favor of
climate policy. However, BP is not acting altruistically here; they are making a calculated business
decision. In looking at the future of the energy sector in the world, they have decided to move their
investments in alternative energy and actively lobby in favor of market-driven policies requiring
mandatory reductions in GHG emissions, albeit weaker reductions than most climate scientists
recommend are required, because these policies often come with subsidies for the investments they are
making in renewable energy, thus boosting their profits. This demonstrates that there is a split in opinion
between oil companies regarding what climate policy to pursue, how to best position themselves for
future profit making, and how to best utilize their influence in their respective political systems.
A later study by Ingvild Andreassen Saeverund and Jon Birger Skjaerseth confirms a similar
trend in the development of climate strategies among oil companies.149 Looking at some of the same
companies, they find that ExxonMobil actively lobbies the US government against any climate policy
requiring mandatory emissions reductions and argues that this company was “instrumental” in the US
decision to reject the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast, the oil companies Royal Dutch Shell and BP actively
pursue the possibility of new market opportunities within climate policy, and have set an example among
oil companies in terms of reporting and verifying their own GHG emissions as well as developing
emissions trading schemes similar to the European ETS created in 2007. However, Saeverund and
Skjaerseth found that while there were large differences in the strategy formulation between these
companies, their actual differences in implementation of these strategies was much more similar.
In looking at actual spending of the largest fossil fuel companies, many of these themes become
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apparent. Figure 6 (below) gives a snapshot of the “Big 5” oil and gas producing companies’ profits and
investments in 2008 (in millions USD). These data demonstrate the priorities of the largest oil
companies in the world. ExxonMobil, the by far the largest and most profitable company, made roughly
$45 billion in profit in 2008 (which was among the top world records for annual profits by a corporation
in world history). A vast majority of this profit went back to investors and executives, and only .02% of it
went towards investments in renewable energy, while more than three times that amount (over $30
million) went towards influencing the 2008 US federal elections with the goal of preventing any climate
policy from emerging. Alternatively, BP, which made much less in profit, made significantly greater
investments in renewable energy (150 times more than that of ExxonMobil).
Oil Company Data (2008)

Exxon
Shell
BP
Chevron Conoco
Mobil
Philips
Profits (millions)
$45,220 $26,288 $21,157
$23,940 $16,830
Amount invested in stock buybacks and dividends
$40,100 $13,307 $11,644
$8,000 $11,029
Amount invested in renewable energy
$10
$500
$1,500
$1,250
$650
Political contributions to 2008 US federal elections
$1.2
$0.3
$0.5
$1.0
$0.7
Lobbying in 2008
$29.00
$3.3
$10.5
$14.5
$8.5
Figure 6 – Profits and Investments of the “Big 5” Oil Companies for 2008 (in millions USD)150

Research by David Levy and Ans Kolk examined why these oil companies take different
strategies in their approach to climate policy and found that it had to do with a number of institutional
factors, mainly 1) regulatory expectations, 2) norms concerning the conduct of business-government
relations, and 3) cognitive assumptions of executives within each company regarding the future of fossil
fuels and substitute technologies.151 Levy and Kolk attributed these institutional factors to the political
context of the home-country for these oil companies, with US-based oil companies (like ExxonMobil)
taking a more hostile stance towards climate policy and European-based oil companies (like Royal Dutch
Shell and BP) taking a more accommodating stance towards climate change policy.
“Alternative Energy” and “Renewable Energy”
As discussed above, fossil fuel companies play an active and significant role in the creation of
national and international climate policy making, especially in the US and EU countries. And, in the case
of companies like BP, some oil and gas companies have begun actively diversifying their investment
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portfolios to include alterative and renewable forms of energy. However, recent decades have also seen a
rise in independent alternative energy and renewable energy companies. But not all forms of “alternative
energy” are necessarily “renewable” and there is considerable debate within scientific circles about the
ecological impact of various energy sources, and political and economic circumstances that continue to
shape which technologies receive investments and which do not.
In his book “Global Energy Shifts: Fostering Sustainability in a Turbulent Age,” Bruce Podobnik
examines historical energy shifts (first from coal, then to oil) and discusses the current state of alternative
and renewable energy politics.152 He begins with a discussion about why a global energy shift is currently
underway, with political considerations about energy independence, concerns about “peak oil,” market
competition for finite energy sources, and climate change all converging to encourage global leaders to
encourage energy alternatives to oil. The alternatives he primarily focuses on are 1) natural gas, 2)
nuclear power, and 3) “renewables” (including hydroelectric, biofuel/biomass, wind, solar, geothermal,
and tidal).
Natural gas is perhaps the number one alternative fuel promoted by the governments of industrial
countries and alternative energy companies. Podobnik points out that natural gas is still a fossil fuel,
however it is “the least environmentally harmful of all hydrocarbons,” and it “generates 40% less carbon
dioxide than oil and 75% less than coal.”153 It is currently heavily pursued in many industrial, urban
centers (Podobnik cites Shanghai and Los Angeles as two primary examples). However, there is
considerable controversy over the method for extracting natural gas, called hydraulic fracturing (or
“fracking”) which research has shown can be highly dangerous to human health, local water supplies, and
natural ecosystems. Additionally, while the burning of natural gas does emit less carbon than oil and
coal, when the process of “fracking” is taken into account some experts believe it releases the same
amount, if not more, of carbon than oil.154 Still, Podobnik believes that given the large resources of
natural gas deposits recently discovered coupled with the need for governments to diversify their energy
supplies, natural gas is likely to play a significant role in alternative energy of the future. However, it is
unclear what role natural gas will play in climate policy given that it still emits GHGs, with energy
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companies arguing for subsidies and increased access to natural gas as an alternative to coal and oil, while
environmentalist groups continue to attack it as an inappropriate form of alterative energy.
Nuclear power is another controversial form of alternative energy. As Podobnik points out,
Nuclear power generates a lot of electricity while resulting in little to no GHG emissions. However,
while nuclear waste does not directly contribute to climate change, there is still no proven safe and
effective way of disposing it. And there is question about GHG emissions emitted during the construction
of nuclear power. Economically, nuclear power is not feasible without significant assistance from
governments, primarily through the use of subsidies, so there is intense lobbying on behalf of nuclear
power companies to continue and even enhance these subsidies in various climate-related policies.
However, as Podobnik points out, there is also geopolitical concerns about the ability of nuclear power to
be an important alternative energy source for the world given that with nuclear power often comes
geopolitical security concerns and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.155 For this reason, Podobnik does
not believe that nuclear power will be the focus of the next energy shift.
There are many energy sources that are included in Podobnik’s “renewables” category, which
currently produces about 3% of the global energy supply. Most prominent among these are hydroelectric
dams, which accounted for roughly 2.7% of commercially produced energy in 2000.156 However,
hydroelectric dams have been highly politicized for their devastating human-ecological impacts across the
world, including but not limited to countries like India and China. The World Commission on Dams
estimates that “somewhere between forty and eighty million people have been displaced by dams, while
many ecosystems and culturally valued sites have been inundated.”157 And the people who are most
impacted and displaced by dams tend to be indigenous peoples, peasants, and poor rural farmers.
Another form of “renewable” energy that Podobnik discusses is the use of biofuels/biomass. This
makes up most of the renewable energy portfolio for industrial countries (roughly 89% of the OECD
countries’ “renewable” energy portfolios). However, there is controversy around how “renewable” these
fuels are, given that they are at best carbon-neutral, but often require the use of fossil fuels to produce and
transport. They also place considerable strain on global food resources and have been accused of
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contributing to recent global food crises that have primarily affected the poor. 158 Despite these concerns,
biofuels remain a major part of industrialized countries’ energy portfolios, especially given that many of
their agricultural systems are heavily subsidized. Therefore, biofuels will continue to be debated.
Because of these impacts and the ensuing political opposition, Podobnik believes other forms of
renewable energy hold more promise, but still remain far off. These include wind power, solar power,
geothermal and others. These technologies are for the most part zero-emissions technologies (except for
in their construction), but remain costly. They currently make up about 5% of industrialized countries’
renewable energy portfolios, and less than 1% of energy production worldwide.159
In each of the alternative energy technologies mentioned above a number of obstacles stand in
their way of widespread use to replace oil and coal. First and foremost, they all compete with oil and coal
in terms of cost, and these dirty sources of energy have a vast global infrastructure in place making them
often the cheaper option. Without government assistance, they are not likely to be competitive with fossil
fuels. Geopolitical concerns prevent states from advocating for technologies like nuclear power. And
political and social groups have organized against the use of controversial technologies like natural gas
and biofuels. And there are environmental concerns around nearly all of these options, with many
environmentalists advocating for wind and solar as the least-ecologically damaging options.
As with the fossil fuel industry, alternative and renewable energy companies are profit-seeking,
and therefore they all lobby policy makers to be included in climate policy. However, these companies all
lobby for market-driven solutions similar to those found in “Cancún” because they will benefit from
carbon markets, subsidies, and technology transfer mechanisms that are likely to result. Thus, they all
stand opposed to strict, anti-market-driven and rights-based climate policies like the “People’s Agreement
of Cochabamba.” It is clear that energy industries, both fossil fuels and alternatives, play a significant role
in shaping climate policies, but do so almost exclusively for market-based solutions.
Global Civil Society and Climate Policy
So far, I have explored how state politics and the political economy of various energy industries
have shaped and disciplined the climate policy debate. While these factors have largely been responsible
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for explaining what happened at the UNFCCC, one must also look into the effect that global civil society
has had on these debates, especially those in the US and Europe who have so far been largely responsible
for shaping the debate and advancing the neoliberal solutions of “Cancún.” Here, I will look primarily at
the role of 1) Environmentalist Organizations, 2) Organized Labor, and 3) the role of organizations and
social movements in the “Global South” (e.g. peasants, farmers, and indigenous peoples).
Environmentalists Organizations
While the official negotiators within the UNFCCC are representatives of state governments,
environmentalist organizations play a rather significant role in the process. They mobilize support from
the public, lobby governments and UNFCCC delegates, and attempt to advocate for strong climate
policies to protect the environment. However, like with the energy industry, there is a diversity of
opinions among environmentalist organizations about their approach to climate policy.
At the conclusion of the UNFCCC summit in Cancún, it was praised by many large international
environmental organizations. Greenpeace International proclaimed, “governments in Cancún, Mexico,
have chosen hope over fear and put the building blocks back in place for a global deal to combat climate
change.”160 Oxfam International celebrated the “Cancún Agreements” in a press release titled “Cancún:
The Building Blocks Have Been Laid.”161 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) called the
“Cancún Agreements” a “foundation from which to build greater international action on global
warming.”162 The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) greeting the deal as positive news with their press release
titled “Cancún Gives Climate Talks New Life.” And the conservation group Conservation International
claim the “Cancún Agreements set forth a balanced package of decisions” that “represent a critical step
for reinvigorating the international climate change policy process.”163 Many of these organizations
pointed to the creation of the Green Climate Fund, the agreements on carbon offsets like the Reducing
Emissions through Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD), and the commitments by governments
around the world to voluntary GHG emissions reductions as positive signs of moving the climate regime
agreement forward while also recognizing that there is still much more work to be done.
However, not all organizations felt that the deal was good for the environment, or that it was an
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encouraging step in the right direction. The Indigenous Environmental Network released a statement
where they “express their outrage and disgust at the [Cancún Agreements] that have emerged from the
COP16 talks,” and claimed that what happened in Cancún was a “betrayal” calling the UNFCCC the
“WTO of the Sky” (in reference to the neoliberal trade organization the World Trade Organization).164
Friends of the Earth US released a statement of mixed reactions to the “Cancún Agreements” calling them
a “wholly inadequate response” because of the “embrace of the ‘pledge-based’ paradigm, with rich
countries polluting however much they like.”165 They do, however, point to the creation of the Green
Climate Fund as a positive development, while criticizing it for coming “nowhere close to providing
sufficient funding to developing countries,” and for inviting the World Bank to be trustee of the fund
(another neoliberal institution). The ETC Group, an international organization dedicated to the
conservation and sustainable advancement of cultural and ecological diversity and human rights, released
a report claiming “the failure of Copenhagen was evident, as was the coup-like attempt of the most
polluting countries to impose their will and free themselves from any responsibility. Cancún saw the
imposition of an expanded version of the failed Copenhagen text, but this time with the participation of
almost all governments except Bolivia.”166 These organizations all criticize “Cancún” as a bad deal and a
step in the wrong direction. They cite the modest and non-mandatory GHG emissions reductions, the lack
of climate funding provided, and the imposition of neoliberal policies by wealthy, polluting countries on
poorer nations of the “Global South” as their primary areas of concern.
What accounts for the differences in positions between these environmental organizations? The
answer to that question is similar to the reason for diversity among corporations in the energy industry:
understand the context within which these organizations operate, and follow the money. The
environmental organizations that are mostly based in the “Global North,” or primarily in the US and/or
EU, have their views shaped largely by the political and economic contexts within which their climate
policies are formed, and thus many of them supported “Cancún.” The organizations that most heavily
criticized the agreements come primarily from the “Global South,” and represent indigenous peoples,
peasants, and resource poor countries that are most vulnerable to climate changes (with the exception of
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Friends of the Earth US, who criticized the agreements while acknowledging some modest successes).
Another important element operating behind the scenes has to do with where these
environmentalist organizations are funded. Journalist Johann Hari looked at the issue of financial ties
between environmental organizations and polluting industries, and how this affects their climate advocacy
work. He begins by asking why did US-based environmentalists go to Copenhagen to “lobby for policies
that will lead to… runaway global warming? Why are their lobbyists dismissing the only real solutions to
climate change as ‘unworkable’ and ‘unrealistic,’ as though they were just another sooty tentacle of Big
Coal?”167 He argues that many of the environmental organizations that ended up lobbying on behalf of the
“Copenhagen Accord” were organizations that have accepted significant financial contributions from
GHG polluting industries. He singles out the organization Conservation International for accepting large
sums of money from BP as an example of a shift from a previous trend when environmental organizations
used to be funded by individual members, holding big polluting companies accountable. However, Hari
notes that this began to change in the 1990s when they began making partnerships with polluting
industries, which influenced their advocacy actions to be more conducive to the interests of polluters.168
Environmentalist organizations, while perhaps not as powerful as state governments and with
fewer resources at their disposal than most corporations in the energy industry, do still play a role in
advocating for climate policy. As demonstrated above, many of the largest environmental NGOs from
the “Global North,” dependent upon wealthy donors or corporate contributions to stay alive, have leant
their support to “Cancún” and the market-driven solutions to climate change because they are consistent
with the political and economic contexts within which they exist. Alternatively, smaller environmental
organizations from the “Global South” have generally remained critical and outspoken in their opposition
to the agreements as being too weak, too inadequate, or too neoliberal in orientation.
Organized Labor
Another important sector of civil society that does have influence over policy-making, especially
in the US and EU countries, is organized labor. While on the surface climate change may appear to be a
separate issue from employment, the impacts of climate change and climate change policy on
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employment will be substantial. For this reason, unions have been actively engaged in climate and energy
policies. However, different unions have different approaches to climate policy depending on where the
union is from, or what industry they are in. Sometimes the issue can pit one union against another, or
unions against environmentalist organizations. For example, the American Federation of Labor –
Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a federation of 57 unions in the US representing over
12.2 million workers, was outspokenly opposed to the Kyoto Protocol. In the late 1990s, AFL-CIO
lobbied then US President Bill Clinton to oppose the Kyoto Protocol, saying that if the treaty were ratified
it would give incentives to US businesses to move offshore in search of cheaper labor and fewer
environmental regulations, which they claim will ultimately cause the loss of 900,000-1.5 million US
jobs.169 They also cite any form of carbon tax or carbon trading scheme that would increase the cost of
electricity as reasons for opposing any climate policy because it will drive up the cost of living for middle
class workers. Many other unions have shared these anti-climate policy concerns, most notably unions
representing workers in the coal and oil industries. In 1999, the President of the United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) testified before the US Congress and said this of the Kyoto Protocol:
We believe that proposed greenhouse gas reduction policies will result in lost jobs, lost economic
output, lower wages, higher energy prices and higher trade deficits for America. The effects will
be particularly harsh on low-income workers and seniors living on fixed incomes. And we will
have created a perverse economic incentive for American companies to relocate operations
abroad.170

Many unions have historically had issues with strict climate policies for fears that they would have a
negative economic impact and ultimately hurt workers in Western countries.
However, there has been a notable shift in the attitudes of organized labor in many Western
countries in the past decade. Anthony Giddens writes of the recent trend referred to as a “Climate Change
New Deal” in which the focus is not so much on lost jobs from GHG emitting industries, but instead on
job creation in renewable energy and other “green” technologies.171 Many countries in Europe,
particularly Germany, tout job creation in sectors like wind energy as examples of this; however, as
Giddens points out, most new technologies reduce the need for labor. For instance, wind and wave
energy technologies typically require fewer jobs per unit of electricity when compared to coal-mining.172
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Additionally, the UN Environment Program (UNEP) recently published a report on the employment
impacts of environmentally-friendly jobs and climate policies. The report recognizes that some jobs will
be created, some jobs will be destroyed, and others will be transformed to adapt to changes in industry.
This process of “creative destruction” will pose a challenge to workers in many industries, which is why
the UNEP recommends policy makers consider employment issues when crafting climate policy.173
Similarly in the US, the former chief advisor on “Green Jobs” to President Barack Obama, Van
Jones, wrote a book called the “Green Collar Economy: How One Solution Can Fix Our Two Biggest
Problems” in which he argues that the key to economic recovery and creating lasting jobs within the US
will come through a market-driven climate based policy.174 He argues that jobs in renewable energy and
“green” technology, including jobs like weatherizing buildings, are jobs that cannot be outsorced. He
argues that the US government should take an active role in combining strong employment protections to
help manage the “creative destruction” from old, “dirty” energy jobs as they transition to new, “green”
jobs. A lot of these jobs will be created through new investments in infrastructure and weatherization
programs in the US, financed through carbon-trading or a carbon-tax, and would need to be combined
with job training programs to prepare workers who would otherwise be left out of this transition.
Namely, Jones singles out people of color, who have higher rates of unemployment in the US, as
important groups to target with these policies to ensure economic and environmental justice.
Given the diversity of opinion among various groups of organized labor, and the varying impacts
that both climate change and climate change policy will have on employment, organized labor will
continue to play a role in shaping the climate policy debate. But again, as with the trend in the energy
industries and environmental organizations, most factions of organized labor in favor of mandatory GHG
emissions reductions advocate for market-driven climate policies that would stimulate economic growth
and create new jobs in various “green” technologies.
The “Global South”: Peasants, Farmers, and Indigenous Peoples
Thus far in this chapter, most of the political economic forces that have shaped the climate policy
debate have been from within the “development discourse.” They have largely been the actors,
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institutions, and incentives that have promoted neoliberal policies around the world for decades: national
governments of wealthy Western states, large private corporations, and big environmental NGOs and
federations of organized labor. Their interests are not exactly the same, however they do overlap in this
instance and form a coalition of sorts. They operate within mostly Western-dominated institutions and
environments, and are accountable to political and economic power rooted in industrial capitalism. Thus,
most of the support from these organizations tends to promote weak, market-driven climate proposals
similar to “Cancún.” While only one state, Bolivia, refused to sign onto these agreements, and instead put
forth the “Cochabamba,” a number of civil society organizations from the “Global South” have supported
them while refusing to support “Cancún.” These groups are primarily representatives of various peasants,
farmers, and indigenous peoples, and they largely embody the poststructural critique of development and
sustainable development discussed in Chapter 1.
Perhaps the largest and most actively vocal groups leading this movement is La Via Campesina, a
network of 150 organizations in 70 countries with more than 200 million members. They refer to
themselves as “the largest movement of peasant farmers and artisanal food producers in the world.”175 In
their official statement on their opposition to “Cancún” they argue that “no agreement is better than a bad
agreement,” citing opposition to the basic tenants of the “neoliberal” climate deal: weak and non-binding
GHG emissions reductions, REDD carbon offsets, CDM carbon credits, the imposition of industrial
agriculture, and the involvement of neoliberal institutions such as the World Bank.176 Instead, La Via
Campesina has called for passage of the “Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth” and voiced their
support for the rights-based “Cochabamba” as an alternative set of proposals.
Other organizations from the “Global South” have voiced similar condemnation of “Cancún.”
The Hemispheric Social Alliance, a movement comprised of social organizations and networks
throughout the Americas, argued that the “[Cancún] do[es] not constitute a step forward. On the contrary,
it entails the formal adoption of the so-called “Copenhagen Accord,” completely avoiding the search for
real solutions to the climate crisis.” Later, they accuse the UNFCCC process of being anti-democratic,
and characterizing Cancún as “a repeat of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, in which
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the will of a few was imposed on the world’s population.”177 And the Transnational Institute (TNI)
claims that “Cancún sets us on a dangerous path to runaway climate change.”178 These networks and
organizations from the “Global South” remain deeply critical of the neoliberal project, accuse it of being
anti-democratic, and critique “Cancún” for being a mere expansion of neoliberalism in the name of a
falsely conceived, and strictly Western notion of sustainable development.
All of the climate policies put forth by “Cancún” advocates are focused on sustaining an
economic system rooted in endless growth and consumption, and trying to meet an ever-growing demand
for energy in a globalized economy. However, many of these peasants, farmers, and indigenous groups
from the “Global South” call this into approach question. Vandana Shiva, discussed earlier in Chapter 1
as a “Deep Ecologist” argues for a very a similar climate policy as she critiques of capitalist forms of
“sustainable development.” Rather than focus on sustaining the industrial, capitalist system (which she
accuses climate policies inclusive of commodification of pollution, imposition of carbon markets,
utilization of carbon offsets, and other various market-driven solutions) she instead calls for a
decentralized economic system and energy systems embedded within society and ecosystems. Shiva
criticizes climate policies aimed at continuing an economic system predicated upon endless consumption
and shifting over to newer forms of energy technology. Instead, she advocates for changing labor and
property relationships by creating a de-centralized network of small, locally-owned farms. She argues that
human beings should provide the energy needed by working on these farms (instead of fossil fuels),
which would simultaneously fix the problems of both the global food crisis and unemployment. However,
she recognizes that this would mean a return to (or sustaining of) lifestyles and society-nature
relationships that challenge neoliberal, industrial capitalism. Unfortunately, these groups in the “Global
South” lack significant political and economic power, and when international climate policy is being
formulated they are often ignored in the way that Bolivia was cast aside so quickly in Cancún.
Chapter 3 Conclusion
This Chapter attempted to answer the question of why “Cancún” emerged from the UNFCCC
negotiations despite the widespread rejection of the almost identical “Copenhagen Accord” just one year
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earlier. Through an in-depth analysis of geopolitical state politics I demonstrated the important role that
the US and other EU governments played in the negotiations, both in terms of originally crafting the
market-driven policies and in actively co-opting and/or coercing other governments into supporting them.
I then demonstrated the role that various energy industries have played in manipulating public opinion
around climate policy, crafting market-driven climate policy that favors their economic self-interest, and
lobbying Western governments in support of them. Analyzing the role of various civil society actors such
as environmentalist organizations and organized labor further demonstrated how purely economic
calculations and segmented interests has shaped environmental and labor constituencies to support
market-driven climate policy. The only group in global civil society that seems to remain an outspoken
critic of “Cancún” and similarly market-based climate policies seems to be organizations that represent
various subaltern populations in various parts of the “Global South,” such as peasants, farmers and
indigenous peoples. These organizations, and the state of Bolivia, continue to advocate for
“Cochabamba” as an alternative set of policy proposals because it embodies an alternative approach to
sustainable development than their neoliberal, industrial capitalist counterparts. They support a form of
sustainable development that embeds energy production into traditional or existing societies and
ecosystems, sustaining traditional relationships between society and nature, and providing for the wellbeing of everyone in society (not just a small but powerful political or economic elite). Political and
economic power continue to shape the international development debate, and this is clearly evident as
“Cancún” has emerged as the UNFCCC’s framework for future climate policy, further embedding
neoliberal institutions and relationships into a post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime.

85

Conclusion
In this project I set out to explain how sustainable development is understood in the international
climate policy debate by comparing and contrasting the “Cancún Agreements” from the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the “People’s Agreement of Cochabamba”
from the World People’s Conference on Climate Change (WPCCC). I demonstrated that the two different
conferences each conceptualize “sustainable development” in dramatically different ways: “Cancún” is
designed to sustain neoliberal, industrial capitalism through the proposed market-based climate regime,
while “Cochabamba” is designed to challenge industrial capitalism through an embrace of a rights-based
climate regime. I also sought to explain how and why the debate played out as it did at the UNFCCC, and
why Bolivia stood alone in defense of “Cochabamba” while the rest of the world, even countries that
would have benefited more from the latter proposals, stood with the most powerful countries (the US and
China) in defense of a weak climate regime. The Bolivian government embraced a critique of capitalist
development and any “sustainable development” policy focused on sustaining industrial capitalism geared
toward a society of mass consumption (a perspective that is rarely, if ever, fully embraced by politicians of
any state government). Because the policy community has been so inundated within the “development
discourse” that fails to recognize the legitimacy of any perspective other than neoliberalism, Bolivia’s
proposals fell on deaf ears. In summary, “Cancún” is an attempt to utilize neoliberal mechanisms to
sustain industrial capitalism, while “Cochabamba” is an attempt to sustain local social-nature relationships
and cultures by attempting to form a countermovement to market expansion in climate policy.
“Sustainable Development” in the Modern Climate Policy Debate
In essence, juxtaposing these two conferences has demonstrated that these two different policy
proposals are being put forth by opposing sets of political actors who each define “sustainable
development” differently, based off of their own perceived self-interests and conceptualizations of human
“need” and “nature.” “Cancún” embraces a market environmentalist approach in addressing the threat of
climate change in order to sustain the industrial capitalist system. Neoliberal, industrial capitalism frames
human “need” entirely through the lens of market-economics and measured by income and perpetual
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GDP growth. “Nature” is seen merely as an input into the production process, and “sustainable
development” is an attempt to preserve “nature” so that the production and consumption processes can
continue growing at a compound rate.
Proponents of “Cancún” recognize that the industrial capitalist system will be damaged if climate
change goes unabated: rising sea levels, increasing instances of drought and flood, and more frequent
extreme weather events will significantly inhibit the ability of the economic system to expand, and likely
result in political instability in many regions. UK market economist Nicholas Stern famously calculated
that climate change will likely be responsible for an annual loss of 2% of global GDP, which will likely
increase later in the century if no climate regime is put into place.179 Because of the projected economic
losses as a result of climate change, “Cancún” attempts to slow GHG emissions and facilitate a transition
to renewable forms of energy through various voluntary market-driven mechanisms: the commodification
of carbon pollution, the establishment of a carbon market, the use of carbon offsets, and the
administration of climate-related aid to poorer countries most at risk (through the World Bank).
Alternatively, “Cochabamba” can be adequately understood through Karl Polanyi’s theory
“Double Movement” in that it is an attempt to form a counter movement to the expansion of
marketization found in “Cancún.” “Cochabamba” offers a critique of “sustainable development” which
argues that it is commonly conceived as really another continuation of a purely self-regulated capitalist
expansion, and part of a neo-imperialist project that subjugates the rights and livelihoods of people from
the “Global South” and the global environment to industrial capitalism. They believe that the capitalist
system itself is the cause of climate change and seek to limit any economic model predicated upon
endless growth and consumption and instead move to embed market activity within a wider set of social
concerns, in this case a strict climate regime with strong human and environmental rights protections.
Proponents of this perspective call into question the use of income and GDP as a proper measure for
“human need,” instead arguing that each group defines “need” in different ways, and that if the proper
social relationships are institutionalized (for instance, through the use of “common” land) these needs can
be met without adherence to a marketized model. They also critique the marketized understanding of
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“nature” inherent in industrial capitalism, instead focusing on sustaining local and indigenous cultures’
relationships with nature. Lastly, they reject an anthropocentric vision of environmentalism and promote
“environmental rights” as the central aspect of any climate regime.
Neoliberal political and economic power has dramatically shaped the climate policy debate.
Many of the most powerful political actors in the wealthiest governments on earth actively work to
promote the market-driven approaches to climate change. The two largest emitting countries on earth, the
US and China, both resist any climate regime that would require mandatory GHG emissions reductions.
Other, more progressive governments promote mandatory emissions reductions but only through a
market-driven regime like the one proposed in the “Kyoto Protocol” or in “Cancún.” Many within the
energy industry (such as US-based fossil fuel companies), actively lobby against any attempt to build a
climate regime that would reduce GHG emissions. Others (such as EU-based fossil fuel companies, or
alternative and/or renewable energy companies) embrace market-based climate regimes because they can
help facilitate a profitable long-term energy strategy where investments in alternative forms of energy are
subsidized. Many other groups, such as labor organizations in the “Global North” are dependent upon an
ever-expanding global economy for employment. For this reason they have historically stood against any
kind of mandatory climate regime, but have since began advocating for market-driven approaches to
climate change that would help facilitate increased economic growth, albeit with fewer controls on GHG
emissions. And large environmentalist organizations, many of whom are dependent upon donations from
industries and individuals profiting from industrial capitalism, end up advocating for market-driven
policies because they believe they are the most politically feasible solutions they can achieve.
Alternatively, proponents of “Cochabamba” tend to be indigenous peoples, peasants, and
individuals or organizations that are part of social movements from the “Global South” and who are
deeply critical of industrial capitalism and neoliberalism. They believe that their local ways of life,
cultures, and ecosystems are subjugated by weak, market-driven climate policies, and the global
environment continues to suffer. These groups, although representing large sectors of global civil society,
unfortunately wield little political and economic power on the international stage. Policy makers from
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large states, such as the US and EU governments, have actively worked to neutralize, co-opt, or coerce
any government wishing to challenge the market-driven approach of “Cancún.” Various Wikileaks
documents reveal how the US and EU governments manipulated promises of climate-related aid to
countries in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia in return for their support within the UNFCCC.
The same powers that built and spread the global neoliberal system (powerful Western governments,
multinational corporations, various development-related NGOs, and international financial institutions
such as the World Bank) have all actively promoted “Cancún” through the same strategies of cooptation
and coercion in an effort to sustain that same system.
The Way Forward: Climate Change and the Politics of Capitalism
What does this analysis mean for the future of the climate policy debate? Is the debate likely to
change any time soon? Are there alternative approaches that ought to be pursued? Many academics,
authors, and other political actors have asked these questions as the climate debate drags on. Perhaps the
most pressing implication has to do with whether or not the final climate regime will be successful in
addressing the threat of climate change (i.e. halting GHG emissions and minimizing the negative impacts
on human societies and ecosystems across the world). Weak climate regimes, such as “Cancún” show
little sign of significantly reducing GHG emissions to a level that the IPCC suggests would minimize the
negative impacts of climate change (or even meet “Cancún’s” own stated goal of increasing global
temperatures no more than 2C above pre-industrial levels). However, another important implication has
to do with the politics of climate change and capitalism. I believe that climate change has the potential to
mobilize global civil society in a way that no other global issue can. Because it is so inherently
intertwined with the international political and economic system, and because the stakes are so high given
the extreme threat it poses, climate change has the potential to significantly challenge to the neoliberal,
industrial capitalist system.
Geographers James McCarthy and Scott Prudham argue a similar point about neoliberalism and
the environment generally, and it fits precisely within Polanyi’s “Double Movement.” They claim that:
(i) neoliberalism… tends not only to generate serious environmental consequences but… is
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significantly constituted by changing social relations with biophysical nature, (ii) neoliberalism
and modern environmentalism have together emerged as the most serious political and ideological
foundations of post-Fordist social regulation, and (iii) environmental concerns also represent the
most powerful source of political opposition to neoliberalism.180

Here, they argue that neoliberalism has a profound impact on the environment, which is why the sector
that has perhaps the greatest level of regulation in the neoliberal system is typically where environmental
issues are concerned. While understanding that market environmentalism is now the dominant form of
environmental regulation, they also recognize that the single greatest political threat to neoliberalism
comes from environmental concerns. Given the scope of the climate crisis the dramatic overhaul of the
global economic system that is required to seriously address it, climate change could be the environmental
issue that mobilizes various political actors opposed to neoliberalism and give a platform from which to
challenge the system.
Journalist Naomi Klein recently put forth a very similar argument in her article “Climate Change
vs. Capitalism.” She takes a closer look at the polls that I cited in Chapter 3 about the declining belief in
the US that climate change is a real threat. A closer examination of these statistics show something
alarming: that most of this drop has come from individuals who identify themselves as ideologically to
economic right (i.e. a strong proponent of the neoliberal system and for de-regulated “free-market”
capitalism). Klein argues that the reason that most of the climate skeptics come from proponents of
capitalism is because if the climate science is in fact accurate, the basic tenants of the capitalist project
must be called into question. She explains:
The deniers did not decide that climate change is a left-wing conspiracy by uncovering some
covert socialist plot. They arrived at this analysis by taking a hard look at what it would take to
lower global emissions as drastically and as rapidly as climate science demands. They have
concluded that this can be done only by radically reordering our economic and political systems in
ways antithetical to their “free market” belief system. As British blogger and [right-wing climate
skeptic] James Delingpole has pointed out, “Modern environmentalism successfully advances
many of the causes dear to the left: redistribution of wealth, higher taxes, greater government
intervention, regulation.” [Another right-wing climate skeptic] puts it even more bluntly: For the
left, “Climate change is the perfect thing…. It’s the reason why we should do everything [the left]
wanted to do anyway.”181

Klein demonstrates that these skeptics understand that truly addressing climate change means seriously
challenging capitalism, which is why they work so strongly to cast doubt on climate science.
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Klein goes on to detail exactly why this is the case. She focuses on 5 policy areas that would
require significant reform away from the neoliberal model: 1) reinvesting in the public sphere, 2)
increasing social planning at local, domestic, regional, and international levels, 3) reining in the power of
large, multinational corporations, 4) re-localizing production and building locally-based economies, and
5) challenging an economic model that requires perpetual economic growth.182 These fundamental
questions directly question basic assumptions of neoliberalism, and industrial capitalism more broadly.
In light of Klein’s assertion, it is interesting to point out that the only decrease in global GHG
emissions in recent history came in 2009 when global emissions reduced 1.4%. It is widely accepted that
the reason for this is because of the drop in global consumption that followed the 2008 financial crisis.183
However, as policy makers around the world worked to stimulate the global economy back into
expansion, global GHG emissions rose by an unprecedented 5.9% in 2010, surpassing even the IPCC’s
“worst-case scenario” for global emissions.184 Seriously addressing climate change is going to force
policy makers to fundamentally question an economic model that cannot survive without the promotion
of endless production, consumption, and growth. This will pose a direct challenge not only to
neoliberalism, but to capitalism itself.
However, this is a very tall order. Given how quickly world leaders buckled under pressure from
the US government and shifted from rejecting the “Copenhagen Accord” to accepting it just one year
later, and the significant political and economic power behind the promotion of various market-driven
climate policies, launching a serious challenge to neoliberal, industrial capitalism seems unlikely any time
soon. But there are signs that this could change. While the specific climate policies of “Cochabamba”
may not be adopted anytime soon, the government of Bolivia was successful in challenging the
“development” and “sustainable development” discourses as they relate to the climate policy debate.
Bolivia’s proponents have galvanized sectors of civil society and mobilized them behind this critique.
Only time will tell, but one thing is certain: climate change will continue to be a threat for the
foreseeable future, and it will only get dramatically worse without significant action. Addressing this will
require policy makers around the world to truly question some of the most fundamental assumptions of
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neoliberal, industrial capitalism. As debates about “sustainable development” continue civil society and
policy makers will be forced to consider alternatives to the neoliberal model. And as long as human and
environmental rights, however articulated, are subjugated to the profit-seeking interests of an endlessly
expanding economic system there is little hope that climate change will be adequately addressed, or that
climate justice will be actualized.
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